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Introduction and related literatureAbstract
This paper addresses the question of the joint conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy in
a currency union. The problem is studied using a two-country DSGE framework with
staggered price setting, monopolistic competition in the goods market, distortionary
taxation and nominal debt. The two countries form a currency union but retain
ﬁscal policy independence. The policy problem can be cast in terms of a tractable
linear-quadratic setup. The stabilization properties and the welfare implications of
the optimal commitment plan are compared with the outcome obtained under simple
implementable rules. The central result is that ﬁscal policy plays a key role to smooth
appropriately the impact of idiosyncratic exogenous shocks. Fiscal rules that respond
to a measure of real activity have the potential to approximate accurately the optimal
plan and lead to large welfare gains as compared to balanced budget rules. Monetary
policy shall focus on maintaining price stability.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E63, F33, F42
Key Words: Currency Union, Optimal Policy, Flexibility, Welfare
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I study the problem of the joint conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy in a currency
union. The economy features staggered price setting and imperfect competition in the
goods market. The government can levy distorting taxes and issue nominal riskless
debt to ﬁnance a given process of spending. These elements generate non-trivial inter-
actions between the two sources of policy for stabilization purposes. Monetary policy
decisions have ﬁscal implications given the eﬀects on the real value of government
debt. Alternative ﬁscal policies inﬂuence production plans, which are determined not
only by supply but also by demand considerations, given the presence of sticky prices.
In the context of this framework, I ﬁrst show the existence of a symmetric
steady state which entails zero inﬂation and constant positive debt. Then, I de-
rive a linear-quadratic approximation of the non-linear optimal policy problem. A
purely quadratic objective allows to evaluate welfare correctly by using a ﬁrst order
approximation of the equilibrium conditions. The loss function consists of quadratic
deviations of total output, the terms of trade and each country’s GDP inﬂation rate
from their targets compatible with full stabilization. The presence of tax distortions
does not lead to a direct presence of tax rates in the loss function. Nonetheless, the
eﬀects of such distortions show up in the weights attached to the diﬀerent elements
of the objective function.
I characterize the optimal plan that a benevolent central planner would implement
under a timeless perspective commitment. The planner chooses monetary policy for
the whole area and ﬁscal policy for the two countries to maximize the present dis-
counted value of the welfare objective deﬁned for the monetary union. The optimal
plan then serves as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of alternative simple
but implementable rules for monetary and ﬁscal policy. After calibrating the model
to European data, I compare the response of the endogenous variables to a number
of exogenous shocks. Finally, I evaluate quantitatively the welfare properties of al-
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July 2005ternative regimes, searching for the value of the parameters in the simple rules that
minimize the departures from the optimal plan.
The main ﬁnding is that a regime characterized by ﬂexible debt rules for ﬁscal
policy and strict inﬂation targeting for monetary policy approximates accurately the
optimal plan. Flexibility is granted to ﬁscal policy by allowing real debt in each
country to respond to departures of output from its target level. Monetary policy
shall focus on maintaining price stability. The welfare gains of ﬂexible ﬁscal rules, as
compared to balanced budget rules, are quantitatively substantial.
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In the 1960’s, in a series of inﬂuential papers, Mundell [1961], McKinnon [1963] and
Kenen [1969] posed the foundations of the theory of Optimum Currency Area. In
recent years, the macroeconomic aspects of a currency union have gained renewed
attention in the academic research agenda. The creation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1999 and the introduction of the Euro in 2002 among the participant
members has stimulated a notable debate on several issues concerning the appropriate
functioning of economic relations among sovereign countries that share a common
central bank.
The new monetary regime has also been accompanied by the institution of the
Stability and Growth Pact. According to the Pact, national ﬁscal policies are bound
to respect an upper threshold for the deﬁcit-GDP and the debt-GDP ratios of 3% and
60% respectively. Since the constitution of the EMU, several countries have violated
these ﬁscal rules without incurring in the sanctions prescribed by the Pact itself. As
of today, the ﬁscal rules that support the existence of the Euro are under revision.
These episodes bear two fundamental questions. What are the appropriate rules to
include in the Pact? What is the appropriate mechanism to enforce the rules written
in the Pact? This paper focuses on the ﬁrst question. It aims at analyzing, from a
theoretical and quantitative perspective, the stabilization role of ﬁscal and monetary
policies within a monetary union.
In the model economy, two countries form a currency union but retain ﬁscal policy
independence. Given the focus on stabilization, optimal policy will be characterized
from a fully centralized perspective1. The optimal policy outcome will provide a
well-deﬁned benchmark for the evaluation of alternative operational policy rules and
for the assessment of their welfare costs and beneﬁts. Overall, the results will prove
helpful to indicate the appropriate mandate of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities in
the speciﬁc context of a currency union.
The model builds upon the recent work by Benigno and Woodford [2003] (hence-
forth BW). The structure of the economy allows for non-trivial interactions between
ﬁscal and monetary decisions. The typical public ﬁnance approach to dynamic op-
timal taxation is conjugated with the also typical, but somewhat distinct, monetary
approach to optimal stabilization policies. Nominal rigidities, in the form of stag-
gered prices, lead to real eﬀects of monetary policy whereas distortionary taxation
introduces non-Ricardian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. These two key ingredients generate
non-trivial policy spillovers. Variations of the nominal interest rate and the equilib-
rium inﬂation rate aﬀect ﬁscal decisions through the real burden of debt. The tax
rate inﬂuences the pricing decisions of the ﬁrms. Since output is partly demand-
determined, ﬁscal policy interacts with the real eﬀects of monetary policy. Should
the governments be allowed to use lump-sum instruments, the ﬁrst channel would
be shut down. Similarly, if prices were fully ﬂexible, monetary policy would be neu-
tral and aggregate demand would play no role in output determination. The present
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policy to the other and to characterize a normative benchmark for the evaluation of
alternative rules.
In line with the seminal contribution of Lucas and Stokey [1983], a number of
papers have studied non-linear optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy problems, under
various assumptions on the economic environment2. This so-called Ramsey approach
to optimal policy generally characterizes the set of allocations that can be imple-
mented as an equilibrium for a given set of instruments assigned to the policymakers.
More recently, Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims [2003], Juillard [2003] and Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe [2004a] have put forward fully numerical methods, based on an
accurate second order approximation of the model, to solve optimal policy problems
with pre-speciﬁed policy rules3. In this paper, I will follow the proposal of BW,
which blends elements of the two aforementioned methodologies and allows to com-
pare the stabilization properties and evaluate the welfare outcomes of simple and
implementable rules against the benchmark constituted by the optimal commitment
plan.
In the open economy macroeconomics literature, the emphasis has most often
been on studying the nature of the optimal exchange rate regime (i.e., cooperation
versus independence) for a given stabilization problem4. Benigno and Benigno [2003]
reconsider and generalize some of those results in a framework closely related to this
paper but where taxes are lump-sum, so that ﬁscal considerations are not part of their
analysis. My work takes as given the existence of a monetary union, as in Benigno
[2004], but it also considers explicit ﬁscal decisions by adding a stabilization role
for ﬁscal policy. Very recently, Beetsma and Jensen [2004] and Gal´ ı and Monacelli
[2004] discussed the optimal determination of ﬁscal and monetary policy in a currency
union in a model similar to the present one5. Although in both these models ﬁscal
decisions are made explicit by the possibility for the government to choose the amount
of “useful” public spending, the presence of lump-sum taxation precludes any analysis
of taxation smoothing motives6. Finally, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2005] assess
quantitatively the performance of operational rules in a model of a currency union
which features capital accumulation and sticky wages. Once again, the presence of
lump-sum instruments potentially allows ﬁscal authorities to be over-active without
aﬀecting any relevant margin of the decision problem of agents in the private sector.
From a methodological perspective, the absence of lump-sum taxes and the pres-
2Recent examples, in models with nominal rigidities and distortionary taxation, are Correia,
Nicolini and Teles [2002] and Siu [2004].
3See Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2005], Kollmann [2004] and Schmitt-Groh´ ea n dU r i b e[ 2 0 0 4 b]
and [2004c] for applications to models with ﬁscal and monetary policy.
4Examples of this type are Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [2002], Devereux and Engel [2003] and
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2002].
5Lombardo and Sutherland [2004] propose a two-period version of the model by Beetsma and
Jensen [2004] with prices set one period in advance and investigate costs and beneﬁts from ﬁscal
cooperation.
6Duarte and Wolman [2003] study the implications of national ﬁscal policy decisions for inﬂation
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tax rate as a subsidy to eliminate steady state monopolistic distortions. Without
further corrections, a linear-quadratic approximation of the optimal policy problem
would lead to an incorrect welfare ranking of alternative policies. Following the an-
alytical method proposed by BW, it is possible to preserve the tractability of LQ
problems and correctly evaluate welfare up to the second order by using a ﬁrst order
approximation of the equilibrium conditions. The characterization of optimal policy
in terms of dynamic response to exogenous shocks is investigated in relation to the
performance of alternative policy rules. These rules are ‘simple’, in the sense that
can be considered the natural formalization, in the context of a theoretical model,
of the rules that policymakers follow in practice. However, such rules are generally
‘suboptimal’, in the sense that imply welfare losses with respect to the optimal policy
benchmark. The numerical experiments in the last section evaluate the stabilization
properties and assess quantitatively the welfare losses associated to simple rules.
The central result of the paper is that ﬂexibility in either ﬁscal or monetary policy
is always a desirable feature of the simple rules but the welfare gains from a ﬂexible
monetary rule are marginal as compared to the gains from ﬂexible ﬁscal policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I outline the
building blocks of the model. Then, I deﬁne the optimal policy problem and show
that it can be approximated by a linear-quadratic framework where the objective
function derives from a second order expansion of individual utility and the con-
straints are a linear approximation of the set of equilibrium conditions. In line with
the existing literature, the resulting per-period loss function can be expressed in terms
of the deviations of average output, the terms of trade and the GDP inﬂation rates
from their respective desired levels, appropriately deﬁned as the targets for complete
stabilization. Next, I characterize the joint optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy for
the model in the cooperative solution. Finally, I compare the dynamic responses to
exogenous disturbances under these two regimes and evaluate the associated welfare
implications. The technical details are derived in the appendix7.
2 A Model of a Currency Union
The world is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign (also denoted by H and
F hereafter). The total population is ordered on a continuum of measure one. The
size of country H is n ∈ (0,1) and that of country F is 1−n.I ne a c hc o u n t r y ,t h e r e
are two sectors (households and ﬁrms) and one ﬁscal authority. The two countries
are part of a currency union so that monetary policy is chosen for the whole area.
Financial markets are assumed to be complete both at the national and international
level. Goods markets are characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal
price rigidities. Labor markets are segmented. Households oﬀer a specialized labor
input for the production of a speciﬁc ﬁnal good. The implied monopolistic power in
labor supply is captured by the introduction of an exogenous and time-varying wage
7An additional mathematical supplement with more complete analytical derivations and further
details is available on the web at http://homepages.nyu.edu/˜apf210/research/research.htm.
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of the policy authorities.
2.1 Households
All households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1], have the same preferences deﬁned over con-

















where U0 > 0, U00 < 0, ˜ V 0 > 0a n d˜ V 00 > 0. The operator E0 {·} refers to the
expectation conditional upon the information set available at time 0.
Household j sequentially trades in a complete set of one period state-contingent
securities that span all possible states of nature. The random variable D
j
t+1 denotes
the payoﬀ of a portfolio of such state-contingent securities, purchased by household
j at time t. The random variable Qt,t+1 represents the price of D
j
t+1. I assume that
households oﬀer fully specialized labor inputs so that the wage rate is household-
speciﬁc and indicated by w
j




















t stands for proﬁts (net of taxation) from ownership of the ﬁrms.
The consumption index C
j
t is deﬁned as the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over the

























F,t are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators deﬁned over the continuum


































where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within one country.
All the prices are set in the common numeraire. The law of one price is assumed
to hold, so that the price of each variety of good is the same across countries. The
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goods respectively.
The expenditure minimization problem consists of two steps. First, households
minimize total consumption expenditure subject to a minimum level of C
j
t. Then,
the optimal allocation of spending among diﬀerent varieties is chosen by minimizing





In the spirit of the public ﬁnance literature, I will assume that the total amount
of public spending in country i is given exogenously in each period by Gi,t.E a c h
government chooses optimally the composition of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over all
goods produced in its own country8 to minimize expenditure. Given the appropriate
CES aggregators for Home and Foreign production, one can express national GDP
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It is useful to deﬁne the terms of trade as the relative price of the Foreign bundle
of goods in terms of the Home bundle (Tt ≡ PF,t/PH,t). From the expression for the
price index [3], it can be seen that there exists a simple relation between the terms












t +( 1− n). (7)
Movements in the terms of trade reﬂect movements in relative prices, and, hence,
imply demand shifts across countries.
For each household j, the optimality condition for the allocation of wealth among













Under complete markets, idiosyncratic risk is completely shared across households,
both within and across countries. The risk-sharing conditions result from equating
the expression [8] for each couple of households j and k in the population. Hence, for
every {j,k}, marginal utility of consumption is equalized up to the same constant,
which is further set to one. This latter assumption means that the initial state-
contingent distribution of wealth is such that the life-time budget constraints of all
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j




∀j ∈ [n,1] and Ct = C∗
t = CW,t. Finally, given the expression of the stochastic
discount factor [8], no arbitrage implies that the gross return on a one-period risk-
free bond10 Rt satisﬁes
R−1
t = Et {Qt,t+1}. (9)
Labor markets are characterized by an exogenous country-speciﬁc wage markup
(µw
i,t > 1, i = {H,F}) that can be interpreted as capturing monopolistic distortions
in input supply11 or a wedge introduced by ineﬃcient contracting. The optimality












The last ﬁrst order necessary condition for household’s optimization is the in-
tertemporal budget constraint which corresponds to the ﬂow budget constraint [2]











I assume the existence of a continuum of ﬁrms of measure n in country H and of
measure 1 − n in country F.L e th ∈ [0,n]a n df ∈ [n,1] be the indexes for generic
Home and Foreign ﬁrms respectively. For simplicity, I focus on the optimization
problem of ﬁrm h in country H. Such a ﬁrm produces the diﬀerentiated consumption
goodyt (h), which is traded internationally without frictions, using a linear technology
of the form
yt (h)=aH,t t (h), (12)
where aH,t is a technology shock.
Labor is immobile across countries and labor markets are assumed to be seg-
mented12.E a c h ﬁrm acts as a wage-taker and hires workers from an imperfectly
competitive labor market (due to the presence of the wage markup µw
H,t)i nw h i c h
a continuum of individuals supply a ﬁrm-speciﬁc input according to the optimality
condition [10].
9A further implication is that the current account position is irrelevant for the determination
of the equilibrium value of the other endogenous variables and the direction of the ﬂow of state-
contingent securities across countries can be neglected insofar it ensures equality of consumption at
each point in time and in every state of the world.
10Under the assumed structure for ﬁnancial markets, a one-period risk free bond is obtained as a
portfolio of state-contingent securities that pays oﬀ o n eu n i to fc u r r e n c yi ne a c hs t a t eo ft h ew o r l d
with certainty.
11Erceg, Henderson and Levin [2000] endogenize this wage markup by assuming time-varying
elasticity of substitution of labor supply in a model where also wages are sticky.
12See Woodford [2003] for the equivalency between this speciﬁc formulation and alternative as-
sumptions on the labor market structure under complete asset markets.
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staggered basis. Following Calvo [1983], I impose that in each period, independently
of previous adjustments, each ﬁrm faces a probability (1 − αH) of adjusting its price.
















YH,T, ∀T ≥ t,
given the technology constraint [12]. The notation yt,T (h) stands for the demand
at time T (from expression [6]) conditional on the fact that the price of good h has
not changed since period t.T h e ﬁrst term represents sales revenues net of taxes14
τH,t. The second term denotes the total nominal cost of producing yt (h) units of
output. Finally, proﬁts are discounted by the appropriate stochastic discount factor
for nominal assets as individuals are the ultimate shareholders of the ﬁrm.
In the presence of sticky prices, monetary policy aﬀects real activity because
output is demand-determined for those ﬁrms that are not allowed to readjust their
price in any given period. Fiscal policy decisions are relevant because lower taxes15,
ceteris paribus, imply a lower price for those ﬁrms that do reset.
BW show that, under the isoelastic functional forms assumed here for U (·)a n d
˜ V (·), the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm’s problem can be arranged so that the










where ˜ pt (h) is the optimal price chosen by ﬁrm h and η is the inverse of the Frisch

































fH,T ≡ UC (CW,T)YH,T. (17)
13If a ﬁrm is not allowed to choose the price, it adjusts its quantity to meet demand. Given the
assumption of monopolistic competition, this does not necessarily imply negative proﬁts. In fact, I
shall assume that proﬁts are always non-negative in what follows.
14This tax rate takes the form of a Value-Added Tax (VAT) rate.
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gross markup over all current and future (total) marginal costs. The gross markup
can be decomposed in a combination of the price markup (the constant term) and
of the distortions in the labor market due to the exogenous wage rigidities. The
denominator FH,t is the present discounted value of all current and future (total)
revenues net of taxation. These expressions mimic the closed economy result in BW
with the diﬀerence of the adjustment brought about by the terms of trade eﬀect from
sales abroad.
All ﬁrms that reset the price will choose the same optimal ﬁgure. By the law of
large numbers, the relevant price for all the ﬁrms that do not adjust is the country
price index of the previous period. From the deﬁnition of the price index [4], the











which only depends on aggregate variables and where GDP inﬂation is deﬁned as
ΠH,t ≡ PH,t/PH,t−1.
2.3 Policy Authorities
The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate factor Rt.F o l l o w i n gt h e
recent literature, I will abstract from monetary frictions and consider the limit of a
“cashless economy” (see Woodford [2003] for an extensive treatment). This implies
that seigniorage is not a source of revenues for national governments. Nonetheless,
monetary policy has important implications for ﬁscal decisions, as the level of the
interest rate determines the debt burden and the inﬂation rate aﬀects the real value
of debt. Moreover, the presence of nominal rigidities ensures non-trivial eﬀects of
monetary policy on real activity.
Fiscal policy consists of choosing the mix between taxes and one period nominal
risk-free debt to ﬁnance an exogenous process of public spending. The ﬂow govern-
ment budget constraints are
nBH,t = Rt−1nBH,t−1 −
Z n
0
pt (h)[τH,tyt (h) − gt (h)]dh,
(1 − n)BF,t = Rt−1 (1 − n)BF,t−1 −
Z 1
n
pt (f)[τF,tyt (f) − gt (f)]df . (19)
The variables BH,t and BF,t represent the per-capita issues in nominal terms of the
Home and Foreign risk-free bonds respectively16, which are in zero international net
16Per-capita issues refer to the population size of the country of issuance. Households in each
country can purchase public debt issued by the other country’s government while governments are
prohibited from holding each other’s debt. Under complete markets, the latter assumption involves
no loss of generality as long as no non-negativity restrictions on BH,t and BF,t are imposed. In
principle, the government of country H can ﬁnance country’s F deﬁcit (and viceversa) by lending to
the households who have purchased debt issued by country F.
14
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of the price indexes [4], the previous equations can be readjusted to give
BH,t = Rt−1BH,t−1 − PtsH,t,B F,t = Rt−1BF,t−1 − PtsF,t, (20)




(τH,tYH,t − GH,t),s F,t ≡
PF,t
Pt
(τF,tYF,t − GF,t). (21)
In an open economy, the household’s transversality condition does not necessarily
imply a correspondent restriction on the value of debt issued by each national govern-
ment. Even if governments are limited by assumption not to purchase each other’s
debt, in principle, there might exist equilibria where the government of one country
indeﬁnitely borrows from the public, the other government lends to the public and
asset trading in state-contingent securities is such that the households’ transversality
conditions are never violated17. Indeed, the only constraint brought about by the
transversality conditions of the private sector is a correspondent transversality con-
dition on the sum of the asset positions of the two governments (i.e., on consolidated
debt). The scenario just depicted above may be plausible in the case of a benevolent
planner that seeks to maximize the welfare of the whole union subject to the ﬂow
constraints for ﬁscal policy in the two countries, as the leverage of total debt can be
managed arbitrarily at the centralized level. I will argue below that such paths for
government debt are not relevant for the scope of this paper18.
Given the deﬁnition of debt in per-capita terms, the consolidated government
budget constraint19 is the average of the two expressions in [20]
nBH,t +( 1− n)BF,t = Rt−1 [nBH,t−1 +( 1− n)BF,t−1] − Pt [nsH,t +( 1− n)sF,t].
(22)
The appropriate transversality condition for government assets is
lim
T→∞
Et {Qt,T [nBH,T +( 1− n)BF,T]} =0 . (23)
Starting from [22], the resulting consolidated intertemporal budget constraint can be
17A requirement for government debt to be strictly positive, as in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
[2001], would rule out such schemes and would be suﬃcient for the private sectors’ transversality
condition to imply an analogous constraint on each national government’s budget constraint.
18Bergin [2000] points out that an equilibrium with one government indeﬁnitely purchasing bonds
issued by the other country has unpleaseant politico-economic features but cannot be ruled out a
priori. A similar argument is proposed also by Woodford [1998]. Bergin [2000] adds that considering
optimizing ﬁscal authorities would introduce a transversality condition on each government’s value
of debt, just in the same spirit of the one for the households’ problem.
19The consolidated budget constraint presented here diﬀers from the case of a ﬁscal federation,
where ﬁscal policy is managed at the supranational level, insofar only one riskless bond is issued by
the ﬁscal authority in the latter. In such an institutional framework, the household transversality
condition does imply an analogous transversality condition on government assets,a si nt h ec l o s e d
economy model of BW.
15
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where I have deﬁned the real value of debt at maturity in per-capita terms as bi,t ≡
RtBi,t/Pt and CPI inﬂation as Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1.
In the cooperative solution considered here, the benevolent central planner is
required to respect the two ﬂow budget constraints [20] for each period but is only
subject to the single transversality condition [23] on the value of the sum of debt
issued in the two countries. If the optimal plan satisﬁes the two constraints in [20]
and the transversality condition [23], then, the solution always satisﬁes [24] as well.
But the contrary is not necessarily true20 and similarly it is not necessarily true in
general that the two intertemporal government budget constraints are satisﬁed either.
I will elaborate on these issues in the next sections.
2.4 Equilibrium
I restrict attention to rational expectation equilibria where the nominal interest rate
is strictly positive (Rt > 1). It is useful to deﬁne the relative price in country
i = {H,F} as pi,t ≡ Pi,t/Pt and the index ∆i,t, which measures the level of price




















The consumption Euler equation derives from substituting the expression for the









I can then rewrite the demand equation for goods produced in country i [5] as
Yi,t = p−θ
i,t CW,t + Gi,t. (27)
The relation between the relative price in country i and the terms of trade [7] becomes
pθ−1
H,t = n +( 1− n)T1−θ
t ,p θ−1
F,t = nTθ−1
t +( 1− n). (28)
Expressions [26]-[28] describe the aggregate demand block of the economy.
Given the deﬁnition of the price index and the assumption of Calvo price setting,
the measures of price dispersion in [25] evolve according to
∆i,t = αi∆i,t−1Π
σ(1+η)








20The result is an “if and only if” statement only when the intertemporal consolidated budget
constraint is accompanied by at least one ﬂo wb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta tt h ec o u n t r yl e v e l .
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where expressions [14]-[17] can be rewritten in order to be consistent with the rest of
the model as














i,TVy (Yi,T,a i,T)Yi,T,T ≥ t, (32)
and







fi,T =( 1− τi,T)UC (CW,T)Y σ−1
i,T pi,T,T ≥ t. (34)
The ﬂow budget constraints of the two ﬁscal authorities can be cast in terms of
the real value of debt at maturity as follows
UC (CW,t)bi,t−1
Πt






together with the deﬁnition bi,t = RtBi,t/Pt. As noted before, the long run ﬁscal
sustainability is subject to a transversality condition on the value of consolidated







[nbH,T−1 +( 1− n)bF,T−1]
¾
=0 . (36)
At the union level, given the absence of the nominal exchange rate as an automatic
stabilizer, the deﬁnition of the terms of trade implies a one to one correspondence







Finally, from the deﬁnition of the CPI, the relation between CPI inﬂation, GDP
inﬂation and relative prices is
Π1−θ
t = n(ΠH,tpH,t−1)
1−θ +( 1− n)(ΠF,tpF,t−1)
1−θ . (38)
Ic a nn o wd e ﬁne an equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 An imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a sequence of stochastic pro-
cesses Xt ≡ {CW,t,Y i,t,p i,t, ∆i,t, Πi,t,K i,t,k i,t,F i,t,f i,t,B i,t/Pt,b i,t,T t, Πt} that
satisfy conditions [26]-[38] plus the deﬁnition of bi,t,g i v e nﬁscal and monetary poli-
cies Pt ≡ {τi,t,R t}, exogenous processes ξt ≡ {ai,t,µ w
i,t,G i,t} and initial conditions
I−1 ≡ {bi,−1,B i,−1/P−1, ∆i,−1,T −1},f o ri = {H,F} and t ≥ 0.
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rate (τi,t) and that the instrument of the monetary authority is the nominal interest
rate (Rt). Obviously, this choice is purely arbitrary insofar the number of variables
considered as instruments is equal to the number of policies to be speciﬁed21.
3 The Optimal Policy Problem
Total welfare per-capita in country H and F is given by the sum of individual utility


























V (yt (f),a F,t)df
¸)
. (40)
The functional form of the utility of consumption and of the disutility of production22











Id e ﬁne the objective of the optimal policy problem to be the population-weighted
average of the two welfare criteria [39] and [40]
uW,0 ≡ nuH,0 +( 1− n)uF,0. (41)
Using the demand equations [6], the disutility of production in [39] and [40] can



















∆F,t = V (YF,t,a F,t)∆F,t,
Combining the new expressions for the disutility of production with the deﬁnition of









21Indeed, the simple rules analyzed in section 6 will be speciﬁed in terms of the inﬂation rate Πt
and the real debt Bi,t/Pt.
22From yt (h)=aH,t t (h), one can substitute out labor and express the disutility of labor in terms
of output and productivity.
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straints [26]-[38] and the deﬁnition of bi,t, given the exogenous shocks ξt and the
initial conditions I−1.
In the absence of further constraints, the time-zero (Ramsey) solution of the policy
problem implies time-inconsistency of the optimal plan23. In the current example,
the presence of predetermined prices (for some fraction of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y )
and debt implies that the policymaker would have the incentive to reduce the real
value of debt and close the output gap by generating high inﬂation at time zero
and then commit to low inﬂation thereafter. This policy is time-inconsistent because
at any later stage the policymaker would face the same incentive as at time zero.
Should reoptimization be allowed, the optimal policy would be again a one period
high inﬂation and a commitment to low inﬂation in the future.
In order to obtain a time-consistent policy, some form of commitment is required.
For this matter, I follow Woodford [1999] and characterize the optimal policy plan
from a ‘timeless perspective’. This approach imposes on the problem a set of state-
contingent commitments that prevent the policymaker from exploiting future private
expectations along the path of the endogenous variables implied by the optimal policy
plan24. The resulting set of ﬁrst order conditions can then be interpreted as the policy
rules that a traditional Ramsey solution would eventually follow, whereas the initial
(time zero) policy prescription would diﬀer insofar the Ramsey planner does not
internalize the eﬀects of previous expectations on the initial policy.
The next deﬁnition formalizes the requirements of the optimal policy plan.
Deﬁnition 2 The optimal plan is a sequence of policies Pt that maximize uW,0 such
that the implied allocation Xt constitutes an equilibrium and the additional constraints
of the timeless perspective are satisﬁed, for given exogenous processes ξt and initial
conditions I−1.
The non-linear optimal policy problem cannot be solved in closed form. Here, I
choose to study the associated approximate optimal policy problem. To this extent,
in section A.1 of the appendix, I show the existence of a well deﬁned non-stochastic
symmetric steady state supported by an optimal policy plan with no inﬂation and
constant debt. I will then proceed to analyze the solution for small enough distur-
bances25 such that, if the economy starts in a neighborhood of the steady state, it
always stays close to it thereafter.
Before turning to that characterization, it is important to clarify the nature of
ﬁscal policy in the model. In particular, it has been left unsolved the possibility of the
existence of equilibria with explosive paths of government debt that do not violate
the transversality condition on consolidated debt. Indeed, these paths cannot occur
in the approximate equilibrium considered here. The reason is that the approximate
23This problem is a well established result in the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy literature,
starting with Lucas and Stokey [1983].
24More practically, the optimal policy problem is solved under the additional constraint that the
resulting ﬁrst order conditions are time-invariant.
25The exact meaning of “small” disturbances will be qualiﬁed further below.
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endogenous variables to stay close to the deterministic steady state, which is shown
to be characterized by constant and equal debt for the two countries. Hence, one can
safely assume that the transversality condition for either countries is never violated,
at least in the approximate problem. In other words, the class of equilibria consid-
ered here will always be characterized by “(locally) Ricardian” ﬁscal policies in both
countries, in the sense of Woodford [1998] and Loyo [1997], or “(locally) responsible”,
as in Bergin [2000].
4 Calibration
I calibrate the key distinctive parameters of the model, such as the degree of price
rigidity and the steady state ﬁscal stances, in order to match the features of several
countries belonging to the EMU. The remaining values are chosen consistently with
similar studies within the international business cycles literature.
Based on country estimates of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, Benigno and
L´ opez-Salido [2005] divide the ﬁve major economies of the EMU (France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands and Spain, accounting for 88% of the total GDP of the Euro area)
in two groups26. Germany displays a degree of price rigidity substantially lower than
the other four countries, which are, on the contrary, quite homogeneous according
to this dimension. Here, I follow that criterion to identify the two economies that
constitute the currency union. Country H represents France, Italy, Netherlands and
Spain, a total of 53% of the Euro area GDP, which implies that n =0 .6. In those
countries, the average duration of price contracts ((1 − αH)
−1)i se q u a lt o8q u a r t e r s ,
which gives a value of αH of 7/8. On the other hand, country F represents Germany,
where the average price duration is of 5 quarters, determining a value of αF equal to
4/5.
Table 1 displays the recent evolution of government surplus (or deﬁcit) and gov-
ernment debt as a percentage of GDP for the twelve countries that constitute the
EMU27. The calibration of ﬁscal variables is bound to satisfy the steady state govern-
ment budget constraint (1 − β)¯ b =¯ τ ¯ Y − ¯ G. Given the choice of the discount factor,
there are three variables left to be determined but only two of them are independent.
26The estimates of Benigno and Lopez-Salido [2005] are based on a “hybrid” speciﬁcation of the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve, including backward looking price setters not present in the model
presented here. It is shown that the four countries with higher degree of price rigidity also display
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction of backward looking price setters. Hence, the estimates of the degree of price
stickiness inferred from the average duration of price contracts in the two zones cannot be considered
a one to one map to the speciﬁcation adopted in this paper. Nonetheless, the main results presented in
the rest of the paper are robust to alternative assumptions on the value of α
∗ (around the benchmark),
under the maintained assumption that the size of country H is 0.6 (that is, country H represents
the same group of four countries) and that country H is characterized by a relatively higher degree
of nominal stickiness,
27The ﬁrst line of the table also shows population adjusted averages of both variables for the whole
Euro area. The ﬁgures in bold represent a violation of the Maastricht criteria for either deﬁcits (3%
of GDP) or debt (60% of GDP).
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2000 2001 2002 2003
Surplus Debt Surplus Debt Surplus Debt Surplus Debt
Euro Area -0.9 70.4 -1.7 69.4 -2.3 69.2 -2.7 70.4
Belgium 0.2 109.1 0.4 108.1 0.1 105.8 0.2 100.5
Germany -1.2 60.2 -2.8 59.4 -3.5 60.8 -3.9 64.2
Greece -2.0 106.2 -2.0 106.9 -1.4 104.7 -1.7 102.4
Spain -1.0 61.2 -0.4 57.5 0.0 54.6 0.3 50.8
France -1.4 57.2 -1.6 56.8 -3.3 58.6 -4.1 63.0
Ireland 4.4 38.4 1.1 36.1 -0.4 32.3 0.2 32.0
Italy -1.8 111.2 -2.6 110.6 -2.3 108.0 -2.4 106.2
Luxembourg 6.3 5.5 6.3 5.5 2.7 5.7 -0.1 4.9
Netherlands 1.5 55.9 0.0 52.9 -1.9 52.6 -3.0 54.8
Austria -1.9 67.0 0.2 67.1 -0.2 66.6 -1.1 65.0
Portugal -3.2 53.3 -4.4 55.6 -2.7 58.1 -2.8 59.4
Finland 7.1 44.6 5.2 43.9 4.3 42.6 2.3 45.3
Source: ECB Annual Report [2003], p. 56 (available at www.ecb.int)
I choose a steady state tax level ¯ τ = 30%, which approximately corresponds to the
average value of direct and indirect tax revenues as a percentage of GDP of 31.6%
among the EMU members in 2003 (source: OECD Economic Outlook Database).




is assumed to be 60%
(which gives ¯ b/¯ Y =2 .4). This value is lower than the average Euro area debt to
GDP ratio in the last four years (which is around 70%, according to OECD Economic
Outlook Database) but it is consistent with the the upper bound in the Maastricht
Treaty28. It then follows that the public spending to GDP ratio ¯ G/¯ Y is 27.6% and
that the consumption to GDP ratio is sc ≡ ¯ C/¯ Y =7 2 .4%.
Table 2 and 3 report the calibrated values for the remaining parameters of the
model and the implied steady state quantities.
28As it emerges clearly from inspection of Table 1, in the last four years, the vast majority of
countries in the Euro area experienced substantial deﬁcits, the average ranging between 0.9% and
2.7%, with more than one country violating the deﬁcit/GDP threshold of 3% indicated by the
Maastrich Treaty. One feature of the model is that the approximation is performed around a steady
state with positive and constant debt. The assumption of positive steady state debt in turn requires
a positive steady state primary surplus (equal to 2.4% of output, given the choice of ¯ b/¯ Y and β)
which is counterfactual to current data but can be thought as a long run objective consistent with
the choice of the debt to GDP ratio expressed in the Maastricht Treaty and assumed here too.
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n =0 .6 size of country H
β =0 .99 discount factor
η =0 .47 inverse Frisch elasticity
αH =7 /8 degree of price rigidity in country H
αF =4 /5 degree of price rigidity in country F





= 60% s.s. debt-output ratio
ρ =3 coefficient of risk aversion
θ =4 .5 elasticity of intratemporal substitution
σ =1 1 elasticity of substitution among goods
¯ µw =1 .05 s.s. gross wage markup
Table 3: Implied steady state values.
(1 − αH)
−1 =8 q r t . s avg. duration of price contracts in country H
(1 − αF)
−1 =5 q r t . s avg. duration of price contracts in country F
¯ G/¯ Y =2 7 .6% s.s. public spending-output ratio
¯ s/¯ Y =2 .4% s.s. primary surplus-output ratio
¯ C/¯ Y =7 2 .4% s.s. consumption-output ratio
¯ µ =1 .65 s.s. gross total markup
As it is common in the literature, the discount factor β is set to 0.99, that is,
a four percent steady state annualized rate of return. Following Benigno and Be-
nigno [2003], the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to the real wage η,
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion ρ and the elasticity of substitution between the Home
and Foreign bundles of goods θ are assumed to be 0.47, 3 and 4.5 respectively. As
the elasticity of intratemporal substitution θ is larger than the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution 1/ρ, the bundles CH,t and CF,t are substitutes. The elasticity of
substitution among diﬀerentiated goods σ is assumed to be 11, which implies that
the component of the total price markup due to demand is equal to 10%, slightly
lower than the value commonly adopted in the literature29. The only quantity that
remains to be determined is the steady state gross wage markup ¯ µw. I calibrate the
net steady state total markup to be 65%, close to the midpoint between the value in
BW, who consider a total markup of 50%, and the value in Erceg, Henderson and
29When the markup depends on monopolistic competition in the goods market only, the literature
generally assumes values of the elasticity of substitution lower or equal to 10. In order to avoid
excessive steady state distortions, I adopt a conservative calibration, just below the standard values.
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the formula ¯ µ = σ¯ µw/(σ − 1)(1 − ¯ τ)=1 .65, which measures the product of the
gross price markup and the wedges introduced by labor market rigidities and tax
distortions, given the previous choices of σ and ¯ τ, it then follows that ¯ µw =1 .05.
Finally, following existing studies in the international business cycle literature30,t h e
log-linear deviations of average and relative shocks to productivity, wage markup and
government spending, are assumed to follow an uncorrelated VAR(1) process with
common persistence, set to 0.9, and standard deviation of the innovations equal to
0.01.
5 The LQ Approximate Problem
As mentioned, the optimal policy problem illustrated above cannot be solved in closed
form. I follow BW and adopt an analytical approximation that relies on Taylor ex-
pansions around the deterministic symmetric steady state (derived in A.1). I wish to
characterize the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy under a timeless commitment and
from a centralized perspective31 for a local approximation of the non-linear stochastic
problem detailed in section 3. More speciﬁcally, I study a ﬁrst-order approximation
around the deterministic steady state of the optimal plan. As described in BW, a
log-linear approximation of the optimal policy can be obtained as the solution of a
LQ problem composed by a second order Taylor expansion of the welfare objective
and a ﬁrst order expansion of the set of constraints32.
A ss h o w ni ns e c t i o nA.2 of the appendix, the derivation of the second order
approximation of the welfare objective displays some non-zero linear terms in the
endogenous variables. Woodford [2003] discusses how the presence of linear terms
generally leads to evaluate welfare incorrectly by using a ﬁrst order approximation to
the equilibrium relations33. In certain cases, the problem can be solved by assuming
that the policymaker uses the tax rate as a subsidy to eliminate the monopolistic
distortions in steady state (see, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford [1997]). The
same approach cannot be used here because the existence of a non-negative stock of
debt and of a non-negative level of public spending in steady state requires a non-
negative tax rate ¯ τ to satisfy the government budget constraint. Instead, I follow the
method ﬁrst proposed by Sutherland [2002] in a static context and extended by BW to
a dynamic framework34. By taking a second order Taylor expansion of the equilibrium
30See, for instance, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1992].
31It is worth stressing that national governments have independent budget constraints, hence, debt
and taxes are chosen separately for each country. However, the objective for ﬁscal policy is unique,
namely aggregate welfare uW,0.I nt h i ss e n s e ,t h eﬁscal policy regime can also be thought as if the
two independent ﬁscal authorities cared about the welfare of the whole union.
32Benigno and Woodford [2005] discuss why this approach is not suitable to study the solution
of the problem under discretion. The basic reason is that, in case of large steady state distortions,
discretionary policy entails high inﬂation even in the absence of shocks. Hence, ﬂuctuactions around
the steady state (which has zero inﬂation) cannot be considered ‘small’, violating the nature of the
approximation.
33A simple enlightening example of this result is proposed by Kim and Kim [2003].
34An alternative approach would be based on the numerical procedures developed by Kim, Kim,
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July 2005conditions, it is possible to eliminate the linear terms in the approximation of [41].
The result is a purely quadratic welfare objective that allows to evaluate welfare
correctly using a ﬁrst order approximations of the equilibrium conditions.






















stands for terms of order three or higher. The per-period loss function is deﬁned as
LW,t ≡ λyy2
t + n(1 − n)λqq2
t + nλπHπ2
H,t +( 1− n)λπFπ2
F,t. (44)
For any variable Xt,Id e ﬁne the log-deviation from its steady state value ¯ X as




.T h ev a r i a b l eyt ≡
³
ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´
represents the deviation of aver-
age output in the union from its target level ˜ YW,t compatible with full stabilization
(deﬁned in section A.2 of the appendix as a linear combination of the exogenous
shocks). Similarly, the variable qt ≡
³
ˆ Tt − ˜ Tt
´
stands for the deviation of the terms
of trade from its target level35,a l s od e ﬁned in A.2. Finally, GDP inﬂation rates are
deﬁned as πi,t ≡ ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), which implies that the target level for GDP inﬂation
is zero. The parameters λi are combinations of the structural parameters36 deﬁned in
A.2. The term JW,0 in [44] depends on the special nature of time zero. The presence of
the additional constraints for policy to be optimal from a timeless perspective implies
that the function JW,0 (a linear combination of the average initial price dispersion
and the initial real value of debt) can be taken as given. It follows that the pol-
icy that maximizes total welfare is the policy that minimizes the present discounted
value of the loss function LW,t subject to the constraints implied by the equilibrium
conditions of the model and by the additional timeless perspective requirements37,
given initial conditions on the terms of trade and on debt in each country.
Eliminating the aggregate demand equations and substituting for each country’s
relative price with the appropriate function of the terms of trade, one can reduce the
equilibrium conditions to six equations. Along the simpliﬁcation, it is also convenient
to express consumption as the diﬀerence between average output and average public
Schamburg and Sims [2003], Juillard [2003] and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe [2004].
35The the target level for average output ˜ YW,t and for the terms of trade ˜ Tt,a sw e l la st h et a r g e t
levels deﬁned below for the tax rates, are not in general the “natural” levels commonly referred to in
the literature, that is, the levels of variables under the assumption of complete price ﬂexibility. The
target levels would coincide with the natural levels only in the case of ¯ µ = 1, which is not possible
in the current framework.
36The concavity of the loss function L
W
t is not generally guaranteed. Conditions for λi > 0a r e
not obvious to derive. In section A.2o ft h ea p p e n d i x( s e eF i g u r eA.1), I check numerically that the
loss function is concave for diﬀerent values of the steady state tax rate ¯ τ.
37In the context of this model, such additional constraints are imposed on the inﬂation rates (i.e.,
πH,0 =¯ πH, πF,0 =¯ πF and π0 =¯ π ) and on the output gap at the union level (i.e., y0 =¯ y)a n dh a v e
the eﬀect of making the ﬁrst order conditions time-invariant.
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the only endogenous quantity that conveys all the required information for optimal
policy from the demand side.
The ﬁrst two log-linear constraints are the aggregate supply curves of the two
countries. The additional terms, with respect to the closed economy model of BW,
a r ei m p l i e db yt h ee x p e n d i t u r e - s w i t c h i n ge ﬀect of the terms of trade (see Svensson
[2000])
πH,t = κH [δyyt + ωτ (ˆ τH,t − ˜ τH,t)+( 1− n)δqqt]+βEtπH,t+1, (45)
and
πF,t = κF [δyyt + ωτ (ˆ τF,t − ˜ τF,t) − nδqqt]+βEtπF,t+1. (46)
The variables ˜ τH,t and ˜ τF,t are the target levels of taxation in the two countries
compatible with full stabilization38. Those terms and the parameters δy, ωτ and δq
are deﬁn e di ns e c t i o nA.3 of the appendix.
The next relations are the intertemporal budget constraints for the two ﬁscal
authorities39
ˆ BH,t =( 1− β)[byyt +( 1− n)bqqt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τH,t − ˜ τH,t)] + βEt ˆ BH,t+1, (47)
and
ˆ BF,t =( 1− β)[byyt − nbqqt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τF,t − ˜ τF,t)] + βEt ˆ BF,t+1 (48)
where
ˆ BH,t ≡ ˆ bH,t−1 − ρs−1
c yt − πt + ψH,t,
and
ˆ BF,t ≡ ˆ bF,t−1 − ρs−1
c yt − πt + ψF,t.
The parameters by, bq and ωg are deﬁned in A.3. The left-hand side of the government
budget constraint represents the real value of debt at maturity in units of marginal
utility plus a “ﬁscal stress” term (ψi,t), deﬁned in A.3 as a composite of exogenous
disturbances. The current component of the right-hand side is the adjusted expression
for the time t level of surplus, also in units of marginal utility.
The relation between total inﬂation (or CPI inﬂation) and country-speciﬁci n ﬂa-
tion (or GDP inﬂation) can be approximated as
πt = nπH,t +( 1− n)πF,t. (49)
The depreciation of the terms of trade and the cross-country GDP inﬂation diﬀerential
are linked by
qt = qt−1 + πF,t − πH,t − ∆˜ Tt, (50)
38Alternatively, the terms −ωτ˜ τH,t and −ωτ˜ τF,t can be interpretated as “cost-push” shocks that
preclude simultaneous stabilization of GDP inﬂation, the welfare-relevant output gap and the terms
of trade.
39As stressed before, the intertemporal budget constraints for the two governments can be written
only for the approximate problem, given initial conditions close enough to the steady state and given
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July 2005where ∆˜ Tt ≡ ˜ Tt − ˜ Tt−1 is the one-period change in the target level of the terms of
trade. Equations [49] and [50] constitute the last two constraints arising from the set
of equilibrium conditions.
Compared to the closed economy of BW, the presence of structural (the diﬀerent
degree of price rigidities) and exogenous (the country-speciﬁcn a t u r eo ft h es h o c k s )
asymmetries between the two countries introduce one additional dimension to be
taken into account by the optimal policy plan. The cooperative solution needs to
seek an optimal balance between stabilization objectives in the two areas and the
optimal solution of the traditional output-inﬂation tradeoﬀ.M o r e o v e r , d i ﬀerently
from a model with ﬂexible exchange rates, like Benigno and Benigno [2003], the
policymaker needs to directly internalize the distortions due the terms of trade. With
monetary independence, the nominal exchange rate is residually determined through
the PPP relation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. In a currency union, this channel is shut down
and any diﬀerentials in the GDP inﬂation rates are reﬂected in the terms of trade
without absorption by nominal variables. Therefore, the dynamics of the terms of
trade become an explicit constraint in the optimal policy problem. Indeed, in closed
economy, it is only the ﬁscal stress that prevents contemporaneous stabilization of
output gap and inﬂation in presence of sticky prices. In a currency union, even in the
absence of any ﬁscal stress, full stabilization cannot be achieved because the nominal
exchange rate does not absorb the ﬂuctuations induced by terms of trade shocks.
The optimal stabilization policy can be determined following a Lagrangian method.
The policymaker chooses the sequence {yt,q t,π H,t,π F,t,π t, ˆ τH,t, ˆ τF,t, ˆ bH,t, ˆ bF,t}∞
t=0
to maximize [43] subject to the inﬁnite sequence of constraints [45]-[50], plus the
additional initial requirements implied by the timeless perspective, given the set of
initial conditions on debt and the terms of trade.






2,t is the population-weighted average of the Lagrange multipliers on equa-
tions [47] and [48]. The ﬁrst order condition for the terms of trade gap is
λqqt = −ωqϕR
2,t − ϕ4,t + βEtϕ4,t+1, (52)
where ϕR
2,t is the diﬀerence between the Lagrange multipliers on equations [47] and
[48] and ϕ4,t is the multiplier on [50]. The ﬁrst order conditions for GDP inﬂation
rates can be combined to give






− n(1 − n)κRϕ4,t,
(53)
and












− ˜ κϕ4,t. (54)











The set of optimality conditions is then completed by the constraints [45]-[50]. The
Lagrange multipliers on equations [45]-[46] and [49] have been eliminated by appro-
priate substitutions. The parameters ωy, ωq, ωf, κW, κR and ˜ κ are deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n
A.4 of the appendix.
The main feature of the optimal policy plan is the random walk behavior of the
Lagrange multipliers on the value of debt in terms of marginal utility (equations [55]
and [56]). As a consequence, the output gap, the terms of trade gap, the tax gap and
the real value of debt all inherit a unit root. Under the assumption that the target
levels of these variables are stationary (that is, under stationary processes for the
exogenous shocks), the correspondent levels also contain a unit root40.D i ﬀerently
from the standard analysis of optimal ﬁscal policy (Barro [1979]), the tax rate is
not a pure random walk but follows a more complicated integrated process. Yet,
the message is similar. The optimal stabilization plan requires smoothing of the
distortions induced by taxation via a permanent adjustment of the debt level to
guarantee sustainability of the intertemporal government budget constraint.
On the other hand, inﬂation is stationary. If the degree of price rigidity is the
same across countries, the optimal policy plan calls for stabilization of the expected
CPI inﬂation rate (Etπt+1 = 0). This result of stabilization of expected inﬂation
depends crucially on the assumption of sticky prices. If prices were fully ﬂexible41,t h e
optimal plan would call instead for stabilization of the output gap. Still, diﬀerently
from BW, it would not be optimal to achieve a zero output gap in every period but
rather smooth the gap around a constant42. In the general case, the weights on each











Since κH and κF are inversely related to the degree of structural rigidities αH and
αF, optimal policy attaches more weight to the stabilization of the expected GDP
inﬂation rate in the country higher degree of price stickiness.
Finally, the terms of trade has a double nature. On the one hand, it helps achiev-
ing complete intratemporal smoothing because of the unit root property derived from
ﬁscal adjustment. On the other hand, its future evolution is constrained by the adop-
tion of the common currency, that is, by the absence of the nominal exchange rate
acting as an automatic stabilizer.
40Given the permanent eﬀect of stationary shocks on the endogenous variables, a bounded solution
exists only under the assumption that the disturbances occur in a ﬁnite number of periods. However,
neither the total number of periods nor the speciﬁc date of occurrence aﬀects the optimal solution.
F o ra n yg i v e nn u m b e ro fp e r i o d sw h e ns h o c k so c c u r ,al a r g e rn u m b e rc a nb ea l l o w e db ya s s u m i n ga
tighter bound on the size of the shocks for the optimal paths of the endogenous variables to remain
within a given neighborhood of the steady state.
41This case corresponds to assuming αi = 0, which in turn implies κ
−1
i =0a n dλπi =0 .
42A zero output gap would require CPI inﬂation to respond to variations of the ﬁscal stress in
both countries which is clearly impossible.
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diﬀerence equations composed by the set of optimality conditions [45]-[56], which has
general representation
A1Etxt+1 + A0xt + A−1xt−1 = Bξt. (57)










where, for convenience, ﬁscal variables have been expressed in terms of average and
relative stances. The vector of shocks ξt contains average and relative composites of
exogenous disturbances (target tax rates and ﬁscal stress terms) plus the one-period




˜ τW,t ˜ τR,t ψW,t ψR,t ∆˜ Tt
¤
.
Finally, the objects A1, A0, A−1 and B are non-stochastic conformable matrices
of coeﬃcients deﬁned in A.4. In general, the full analytical characterization of the
optimal stabilization plan is highly complicated, mainly due to the contemporaneous
presence of the two government budget constraints and of the evolution of the terms
of trade, plus the structural asymmetries in the degree of price rigidity. Below, I will
mainly refer to the optimal policy plan as a benchmark for evaluation of alternative
(suboptimal) ﬁscal and monetary rules43.
6 Simple Rules
This section introduces the simple policy rules that are assumed to represent the
behavior of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities in the currency union. I express the
monetary rule in terms of CPI inﬂation targeting and the ﬁscal rule in terms of a
constraint on real debt.














t is implicitly deﬁned as the non-linear version of the output gap yt, γ is
a parameter bigger or equal than zero and Cm is a constant chosen so that the rule
43For that purpose, I will solve the model numerically, employing the algorithm by Anderson and
Moore [1985], which provides an eﬃcient method to compute the reduced form solution of system
[57] and to check whether the determinacy conditions are satisﬁed. In section A.5o ft h ea p p e n d i x ,
I study analytically the determinacy properties of the optimal policy plan under the assumption of
equal degree of price rigidity across countries.
44Svensson [1999] discusses the advantages of targeting rules (rather than instrument rules) for
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case that Cm = 1 and the rule becomes a “strict” inﬂation targeting.
On the other hand, the ﬁscal authority of country i is subject to a constraint on











i,t is implicitly deﬁned as the non-linear version of the output gap for country
i (yi,t deﬁned in section A.2 of the appendix), φ is a parameter bigger or equal than
zero and Cf is a constant chosen so that the rule [59] is compatible with the steady
state of the model45.I f φ = 0, then, consistency requires Cf = β¯ b and the rule
requires that the ﬁscal authority of each country maintains the real debt constant
over time46.
The central point of my analysis is the comparison of strict versus ﬂexible policy
rules in terms of stabilization and welfare47. I consider the baseline speciﬁcation of
the policy framework in terms of strict inﬂation targeting (γ = 0) and constant real
debt (φ = 0) and compare the outcome, in terms of response to exogenous shocks
and welfare, with a regime characterized by optimal ﬂexible rules48. The baseline
speciﬁcation of a “rigid” policy regime emphasizes the limitations, for stabilization
purposes, of the current framework in the European Monetary Union. While being
an obvious abstraction, and perhaps an excessively tight formulation of actual poli-
cymaking, it still seems a correct stylized formalization of the institutional features
associated to the EMU in the context of this model.
As far as monetary policy is concerned, article 105.1 of the Maastricht Treaty
states that “The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks shall be
to maintain price stability”. The Governing Council of the ECB further formalized
quantitatively the deﬁnition of its mandate announcing that “price stability shall
be deﬁned as a year-on-year increase of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) of below 2%” (quotes are from the ECB Monthly Bulletin [1999]). More
recently, the Governing Council of the ECB has announced that “in the pursuit of
price stability it aims to maintain inﬂation rates at levels close to 2% over the medium
term” (ECB Monthly Bulletin [2003]). Hence, the institutional mandate is indeed
compatible with a narrow inﬂation targeting regime, at least over the medium term.
The diﬀerence in the level of the target is rather innocuous. It can be accounted
for by the necessity in practice to include the possibility of measurement errors (not
considered here) and hence to avoid deﬂationary monetary policies. A more relevant
criticism might derive from the fact that the model includes an equality constraint
in place of an upper bound. The latest announcement of the Governing Council
45The parameter φ and the constant Cf are in fact equal for both countries. The equality of the
parameter φ deﬁnes the nature of “rule”, as to give an objective criterion identical for both countries.
The equality of the constant Cf depends on the symmetry of the steady state of the model.
46A similar constant debt rule has been used in recent works by Schmitt-Groh´ ea n dU r i b e[ 2 0 0 4 c]
and by Benhabib and Eusepi [2004]
47The determinacy properties of the model under simple rules are discussed in A.5.
48Optimality refers to the choice of the coeﬃcients γ and φ.
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computational diﬃculties of solving the model under inequality constraints. Given
those considerations, an inﬂation targeting rule at equality seems adequate to describe
the mandate of the European Central Bank to maintain price stability.
A constant debt rule, on the other hand, implies from the government budget
constraint that a suﬃcient real surplus must be created in each period to cover net








It coincides with the budget requirement embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, once
variables are deﬁned in real terms. As discussed for the strict CPI inﬂation tar-
geting regime above, constant debt rules (and balanced budget rules such as [60])
might be generally more restrictive than the ﬁscal rules prescribed in the Stability
a n dG r o w t hP a c t( d e ﬁcit to GDP ratio not in excess of 3%, debt to GDP ratio not
in excess of 60%). The absence of steady state growth precludes the possibility of
meaningfully relating the eﬀects of a debt/GDP upper bound on the economies of
the EMU members. This caveat, together with the simpler computational imple-
mentation of equality constraints, play a signiﬁcant role in favor of the speciﬁcation
adopted here49. Moreover, a quick look at Table 1 should reinforce the impression
that modeling a balanced budget rule with strict equality might not be inappropri-
ate, as suggested also by the literature on the deﬁcit bias in the ﬁscal policymaking
process (see Corsetti and Roubini [1992]) and by Stockman [2001] in a related work
on balanced budget rules and optimal ﬁscal policy.
7 Dynamics and Welfare under Simple Rules
The objective of this section is twofold. First, I will analyze the dynamic response
of the relevant endogenous variables to two examples of exogenous shocks. This
exercise provides the basic intuition of the stabilization mechanisms at work and
starkly illustrates the departures from optimality, depending on the diﬀerent nature
of the shocks. The second purpose is the quantiﬁcation of those departures in welfare
terms. One advantage of using a model with microfoundations is that the welfare
objective for policy analysis is clearly deﬁned as a transformation of the individual
utility function. The welfare implications of alternative policies can then be measured
coherently based on the expression for uW,0 previously derived.
7.1 Response to Exogenous Shocks
In this section, the stabilization properties associated with the ﬁscal-monetary regime
described by constant debt rules (φ = 0 in [59]) and strict inﬂation targeting (γ =0
49See also Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2005] for a similar point on ﬁscal rules in a currency union.
It is worth stressing that a rule that allows a 3% ceiling on the deﬁc i tt oG D Pr a t i oa te q u a l i t yn o t
only would imply just a level eﬀect but also would be at odds with the steady state of the model,
which requires the positive level of debt ¯ b to be ﬁnanced by a surplus ¯ s>0.
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by the set of ﬁrst order conditions [51]-[56].
As an example of impulse responses, I focus on the stabilization of average and
relative public spending shocks. The experiments consist of unit innovations in the
processes for ˆ GW,t and ˆ GR,t. The former has a direct impact on the average ﬁscal
stress as well as on the target levels for the output gap and the average tax rate.
The latter aﬀects directly the relative ﬁscal stress as well as the terms of trade and
the relative tax rate targets. In order to sharpen the intuition about the mechanism
of propagation of the shocks, the experiments are derived under the assumption of
no persistence in the exogenous disturbances. I report the responses of union-wide
variables (the output gap yt, the nominal interest rate rt,t h eC P Ii n ﬂation rate πt
and the terms of trade ˆ Tt) as well as of Home and Foreign variables (output gaps yH,t
and yF,t, GDP inﬂation rates πH,t and πF,t, tax rates ˆ τH,t and ˆ τF,t and real value of
debt at maturity ˆ bH,t and ˆ bF,t) for 20 periods (quarters) after a blip in ˆ GW,t (Figure
1) and in ˆ GR,t (Figure 2). In both graphs, the continuous blue line represents the
response of the endogenous variables under optimal policy while the red dashed line
is the response under the alternative regime.
From inspection of Figure 1 it appears that, under the optimal policy plan, the
positive shock to ˆ GW,t is ﬁnanced mostly by higher government borrowing, which
increases by almost 1.5% in its value at maturity, and by a one period increase in
the tax rate50, of slightly less than 4%. As pointed out in section 5, the nature of a
change in the value of government debt at maturity ˆ bi,t under the optimal policy plan
is always permanent, due to the unit root in the Lagrange multipliers associated to
the two government budget constraints51. The reaction of monetary policy consists
of a one period hike in the nominal interest rate of about 1.5%. The contractionary
eﬀect of higher tax rates and higher interest rates counterbalances the expansionary
eﬀect of the shock to government spending so that the output gap and the inﬂation
rates stay at their target levels. Given the aggregate nature of the shock, the response
of the terms of trade is negligible. The reason why it is not exactly zero is that the
optimal plan attaches diﬀerent weights to GDP inﬂation rates in diﬀerent countries,
due to the diﬀerent degree of price rigidities (the relevant measure of the diﬀerent
costs of inﬂation across countries).
50The adjustment of ﬁscal variables are likely to be upward biased by the timing protocol which
allows for contemporaneous responses in a model calibrated to quarterly frequence. However, this
consideration concerns the optimal policy plan as well as the solution under alternative rules. It
seems safe to conjecture that the relative ranking of alternative policies should not be aﬀected.
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Figure 1: Response to a unit innovation in ˆ GW,t.
Under the suboptimal regime, on impact, the response is qualitatively similar.
The main diﬀerence resides in the temporary adjustment of the debt variable. While
the stock of real debt is constant, the real value of debt at maturity varies to the
extent that it mimics variations in the nominal interest rate52. Taxes must respond
to the shock to compensate for the constraint on debt. Given that the real value of
debt at maturity reverts back to its initial steady state value, it is optimal for the
government to smooth the higher tax rate over a prolonged period. While the output
gap increases more than under optimal policy on impact (because the response in
tax rates is about 1% less), it displays a signiﬁcant drop in the second period and
reverts back to target as the tax rates return to zero. Given the prominent role played
by ﬁscal stances in this case, the action of monetary policy is limited to a smaller
increase in the ﬁrst period of 25 to 30 basis points, although characterized by more
persistence, similar to what happens for the tax rates. As required by the monetary
rule, CPI inﬂation is maintained exactly at zero and, given the symmetric nature of
the shock, so are the GDP inﬂation rates, with no adjustment required in the terms
of trade.
52This can be easily seen from the log-linear approximation of the ﬁscal rule [59], which delivers
the average relation ˆ bW,t = rt,w h e nφ =0 .
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Figure 2: Response to a unit innovation in ˆ GR,t.
Next, I consider the eﬀects of a shock to relative public spending ˆ GR,t (Figure
2). The diﬀerences between the optimal stabilization plan and the alternative regime
are possibly more signiﬁcant than before, due to the additional degree of symmetry
imposed by the debt rules53. The main feature of optimal policy is that now the
adjustment occurs almost entirely via ﬁscal variables. Optimality requires that in
country H a mix of higher tax rates (slightly less than 1%) and higher debt (a
permanent increase of less than 0.05% ) ﬁnance the temporary shock to government
expenditure. The output gap increases by 0.05% for one period and reverts back to
trend afterwards. The response of variables in country F does not exactly mirror the
response of country H variables. A permanent decrease in government debt of 0.1%
is suﬃcient to satisfy the government budget constraint at the new value of spending
without imposing additional adjustments in the tax rates. The output gap drops for
one period as the objective of optimal policy is the average output gap, that stays
constant. The impact on GDP and CPI inﬂation rates and on the terms of trade
is again quantitatively small, with a more signiﬁcant adjustment of country F GDP
inﬂation, because of the relative lower degree of price rigidity. The outcome is a small
but permanent appreciation of the terms of trade.
On the other hand, the presence of strict debt rules prevents debt from adjusting
53Indeed, the log-linear version of [59] when φ =0r e a d sa sˆ bR,t = 0, which precludes any asym-
metric movements of debt across countries.
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rates. Namely, the tax rate increases by almost 1% in country H and drops by
1.5% in country F. The higher tax rate in the Home country partially dampens
the eﬀect of the positive shock to government spending. The nominal interest rate
reduces by about 10 basis points with a certain degree of persistence (the half-life is
slightly more than a year), inducing an analogous eﬀect on the real value of debt at
maturity. As relative debt at maturity must be zero, the reduction in the interest
rate generates lower debt in country F too. At the same time, though, variations of
the interest rate are consistent with zero CPI inﬂation only through adjustment in
opposite directions of the GDP inﬂation rates, which, in turn, generate a temporary
but persistent appreciation of the terms of trade. In the following periods, variables
start reverting to their long run equilibrium, although it is interesting to notice that,
even with white noise shocks, debt rules generate some endogenous persistence in the
output gap and in the tax rates similar to that present in the dynamics of the terms
of trade. In particular, the tax cut that occurred in country F at the moment of the
shock leads to a temporary but persistent increase of the output gap in the following
periods. On the other hand, the combination of higher taxes and higher output gap
in country H leaves room for a reduction of the tax rate.
I now move to the analysis of the alternative regimes in terms of welfare. After
identifying the optimal coeﬃcients of the ﬂexible ﬁscal and monetary rules, I will
show how a policy regime which involves some concerns for output stabilization can
improve upon the strict formulation considered so far, mimicking closely the optimal
policy response to shocks and leading to substantial welfare gains.
7.2 Welfare Analysis
I construct two welfare measures based on transformations of the objective uW,0 in
[43]. Conditional on the system being in a steady state before time 0, the objec-
tive is invariant with respect to alternative ﬁscal and monetary policy rules, allowing
direct comparisons of diﬀerent regimes with the optimal policy plan and among them-
selves54.
Id e ﬁne the welfare index dp as











opt is welfare under the optimal policy plan and (uW,0)
p is welfare under
any alternative policy plan, indexed by p. The operator E {·} deﬁnes the expectation
over the distribution of shocks at time zero. The welfare index dp measures the
permanent shift in steady state consumption that is lost under policy p with respect
to the benchmark optimal plan and is independent of additive terms.
54This is one important advantage of the approxima t i o nm e t h o de m p l o y e di nt h i sp a p e r ,a sd i s -
cussed in Benigno and Woodford [2005]. In section A.6 of the appendix, I also show how the reduced
form solution of the model, which constitutes the output of the Anderson and Moore [1985] algorithm,
can be used to calculate welfare given the objective uW,0 deﬁned above.
34
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 502
July 2005It is then possible to compare welfare under two alternative suboptimal regimes
and evaluate the welfare costs, in percentage terms, of moving from the ﬁscal-monetary
regime p1 to the alternative regime p2 using the ratio












In g(p1,p 2), the denominator measures the cost of policy p1 with respect to the
optimal policy whereas the numerator measures the reduction (increase) of this cost
in moving from policy p1 to policy p2.
First, I investigate the welfare losses induced by the regime characterized by
strict inﬂation targeting and constant real debt. In absolute terms, the welfare cost
of optimal policy in units of steady state marginal utility of consumption is equal
to 0.0919%. On the other hand, the cost of the strict policy regime is equal to
0.2559%. It follows that the measure ds (where s stands for ‘strict’ policy regime)
takes value equal to 0.003281, which means a permanent loss of 0.3281% in steady
state consumption from adopting CPI inﬂation targeting and constant debt rules
rather than the optimal plan.
Perhaps, it is even more remarkable to note that almost 90% of the total cost is
due to the lack of stabilization in the case of an asymmetric shock. This experiment
complements quantitatively the description of the large and persistent deviations
of the endogenous variables from their target under the suboptimal ﬁscal-monetary
regime documented in Figure 2. While the optimal plan accomplishes stabilization
mostly through ﬁscal policy, the constraints imposed on the use of debt by constant
debt rules strengthen the eﬀects on inﬂation diﬀerentials due to the absence of the
nominal exchange rate acting as an automatic stabilizer. When shocks are highly
persistent, as it is the case in the baseline calibration, the costs of constraining ﬁscal
policy become highly relevant in welfare terms.
Next, I study to what extent the introduction of some degree of ﬂexibility in
either monetary or ﬁscal policy improves upon the strict formulation described in
the previous section. In order to isolate the eﬀects of ﬂexibility in either forms
of policy, I begin with the implications of conducting monetary policy following a
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting when ﬁscal policy is subject to constant debt requirements.
Then, I analyze the potential beneﬁts of introducing ﬂexibility in ﬁscal policy rules,
maintaining the assumption of strict inﬂation targeting for monetary policy. I set to
zero one coeﬃcient at a time in [58] and [59] and search for the value of the non-
zero coeﬃcient which maximizes the welfare criterion uW,0 subject to the remaining
equilibrium conditions. Given the optimal ﬂexible rule, I can then compute the loss
dp associated to that speciﬁcr e g i m ea n dt h eg a i ng(s,xp) of moving from the strict
benchmark regime s to the ﬂexible regime xp,w h e r ep = {m,f} stands for ‘monetary’
or ‘ﬁscal’.
First, I consider the ﬂexible monetary rule [58] which can be written up to a ﬁrst
order log-linear approximation as
πt + γ∆yt =0 . (63)
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tion on the search for the optimal γ. By assumption, I consider only positive values
of the parameter to guarantee a standard countercyclical formulation of monetary
policy. Hence, the rule permits deviations from the main objective of price stability
to the extent that output is oﬀ t a r g e t ,i naw a ys i m i l a rt ot h eﬂexible inﬂation tar-
geting rules in Svensson [1999]. In this case, the optimal value of γ is 0.05, which
implies a relatively small weight on the stabilization of the real activity indicator.
The absolute welfare cost of the suboptimal policy is equal to 0.2477%, quite
close to the case of strict inﬂation targeting. As compared to the optimal plan, the
measure dm takes value 0.3116% while the gains of moving to the more ﬂexible form
of CPI inﬂation targeting in [63], when ﬁscal policy is bound to obey to strict debt
rules, can be quantiﬁed by g (s,xm)=5 .0337%. Both in absolute and relative terms,
the gains from ﬂexibility in the monetary rule appear to be quantitatively small.
The result is quite robust to alternative speciﬁcation of the indicator of real activ-
ity. If the level of the output gap were to be included, optimality would require a pure
CPI inﬂation targeting (γ = 0). Similarly, if the real variable included was output
growth, the optimal coeﬃcient would be highly biased towards inﬂation stabilization
(γ =0 .01 with an associated welfare gain of 0.8583%).
The second step consists of seeking the optimal ﬂexibility coeﬃcients in the ﬁscal
rules [59] which can be approximated up to the ﬁrst order by
ˆ bi,t − rt + φyi,t =0 . (64)
A rule like [64] provides a margin of action for national ﬁscal policies to respond to
ﬂuctuations in real activity. In particular, governments can deviate from maintaining
constant debt and a balanced budget when output is oﬀ target. The rule can indeed
be recast in terms of current surplus as
(1 − β)ˆ si,t = ˆ bi,t−1 − πt + βφyi,t, (65)
where ˆ si,t is the ﬁrst order approximation of the primary surplus. According to [65],
ﬁscal authorities run a balanced budget whenever output is at its desired level and
are required to adjust the current surplus countercyclically viceversa. It is important
t os t r e s st h a tt h er u l ei ss y m m e t r i c ,t h a ti s ,i tn o to n l ya l l o w sa c t i v eﬁscal policies
in bad times but also requires virtuous public ﬁnance during booms. As noted, it is
assumed that the rule induces countercyclical ﬁscal policies (φ>0). On the other
hand, the search of the optimal value for φ is limited above by the condition for
determinacy under ﬂexible ﬁscal rules derived in A.5( φ<10.46). A grid search over
the interval (0,10.46) returns an optimal value for the feedback coeﬃcient on the
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Strict (s) − 0.3281% −
Flexible Monetary (xm) γ =0 .05 dm =0 .3116% g (s,xm)=5 .0337%
Flexible Fiscal (xf) φ =9 .55 df =0 .0709% g(s,xf)=7 8 .3835%
The welfare loss under ﬂexible debt rules is equal to 0.1274%, which corresponds
to about one half of the loss under the strict policy regime and the ﬂexible monetary
regime. Compared to the optimal policy benchmark, the welfare measure associated
with the ﬂexible ﬁscal regime is given by df =0 .0709%. Most importantly, the
percentage gains of moving from strict to ﬂexible debt rules are given by g (s,xf)=
78.3835%. Substantial gains would also be obtained with smaller coeﬃcients. If
φ = 5, the gain is still higher than 50% (equal to 64.67%) and still bigger than
15% (equal to 16.03%) if φ = 1. It is paramount to stress the fact that the welfare
gains from a ﬂexible formulation of ﬁscal rules are large both in absolute and relative
terms. The departure from optimality is greatly reduced and the beneﬁts of moving
to a regime which entails strict inﬂation targeting and ﬂexible debt targeting are
indeed substantial. Table 4 summarizes the welfare results associated with ﬂexibility
in monetary and ﬁscal rules.
As a partial caveat, one should also point out that the welfare gains obtained from
a ﬂexible ﬁscal regime are less robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the indicator of
real activity than the results for monetary policy rules. If such an indicator was the
variations of the output gap, the resulting optimal coeﬃcient would be much smaller
(equal to 0.23) and, most notably, the welfare gains would be reduced to 3%. A
similar result would obtain with the level of output, rather than of the output gap,
in the ﬁscal rule [64] (in this case, the optimal coeﬃcient would be equal to 0.26 and
the welfare gains equal to 1.2508%). The level of the output gap appears to be the
natural measure to include in the rule for consistency in the formulation of the model.
Nonetheless, the appropriate design of ﬁscal rules in practice calls for a careful choice
of the indicator to include in a ﬂexible formulation.
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The search for the optimal coeﬃcients in [63] and [64] clariﬁes that the major
source of welfare gains is related to the appropriate design of ﬁscal policy rules.
Indeed, when both coeﬃcients are allowed to depart from zero at the same time,
the optimal coeﬃcient for monetary policy is γ = 0 and the optimal coeﬃcient for
ﬁscal policy is φ =9 .55. In other words, the ﬂexible ﬁscal regime discussed above
constitutes the optimal choice contingent on monetary and ﬁscal rules belonging to
the family [63] - [64] (Figure 3).
Flexible ﬁscal rules that allow debt to respond to deviations of output from target
generate substantial welfare gains because a high degree of persistence is induced in
t h ea d j u s t m e n to ft h er e a lv a l u eo fd e b ta tm a t u r i t y .T h ed y n a m i ce v o l u t i o no fˆ bH,t
and ˆ bF,t under ﬂexible debt rules tracks the pattern followed by these variables under
the optimal policy plan for a prolonged period, thus mimicking, for a substantial
horizon, the unit root nature which characterizes the optimal stabilization. The
persistent adjustment of debt minimizes the distortions related to variations of the tax
rates and the associated deviations of output from its target. Similarly, the response
of the terms of trade induces a substantial degree of smoothing in the international
transmission of the shocks, close to what achieved under the optimal plan. Figure 4
plots the impulse response function to a unit innovation in ˆ GR,t under ﬂexible rules
with γ =0a n dφ =9 .55 and under optimal policy (the horizon is 50 quarters).
38
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 502

































































































Figure 4: Response to a unit innovation in ˆ GR,t under optimal ﬂexible rules.
On the other hand, ﬂexibility in monetary policy becomes important only if ﬁscal
policy rules are suﬃciently rigid. Otherwise, a pure inﬂation targeting is the appro-
priate rule to assign to the monetary authority of a currency union. As discussed
above, the role of sticky prices is central to generate optimality of price stability. If
prices were almost fully ﬂexible55, optimal policy would imply stabilization of the
output gap around a constant. In such circumstances, a rule which generates high
inﬂation volatility and an aggressive response to departures of output from target
would approximate fairly well the optimal plan. Instead, price rigidity implies that
variations of the inﬂation rates are highly costly. It follows that larger welfare gains
are obtained if the main stabilization role is played by permanent (or at least very
persistent) variations in the level of debt.
The results of the analysis can be compared with other studies of ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy in a currency union. Similar to Beetsma and Jensen [2004], the ﬁndings
of this paper conﬁrm the central role of ﬁscal policy in stabilization of relative shocks.
However, ﬁscal policy is active also in response to aggregate shocks. The diﬀerence
depends upon the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary policy when lump-sum
instruments are not available. When monetary policy reacts to an aggregate shock,
55This consideration should be read as a limiting result, for the optimal plan under fully ﬂexible
prices entails indeterminacy of the debt dynamics.
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adjustments, in order to satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint or
any other stricter rule. The model displays also several similarities with the analysis
of Gal´ ı and Monacelli [2004]. In particular, the countercyclical nature of ﬁscal policy
is conﬁrmed in the setup presented here, both under the optimal plan and with sim-
ple rules. Finally, the combined result of price stability as central mandate for the
monetary authority and the activism of ﬁscal policy to stabilize asymmetric shocks is
shared with Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2005]. Remarkably, such similarities hold
despite the diﬀerences in the frameworks, which concern the menu of instruments
that ﬁscal authorities can access, the presence of additional rigidities and capital and
the form of the monetary rule.
Overall, the central message of the paper is that it is possible to design rules that
limit the discretionality of government policies but at the same time allow appropriate
ﬁscal stabilizations of relative shocks. Such rules do not depart too far from those
included in the Stability and Growth Pact but prescribe a more aggressive response of
national ﬁscal stances to ﬂuctuations in the indicator of real activity. The objective
of price stability appears to be the appropriate mandate for the centralized monetary
authority.
8 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the question of the optimal ﬁscal and monetary stabiliza-
tion policies in a currency union where a benevolent policymaker seeks to maximize
an average welfare criterion for the whole area. Fiscal and monetary policy interact
with each other given the prominent role of nominal rigidities and given the wedge
introduced by distortionary taxation. The approximate policy problem can be cast in
a linear-quadratic framework where standard optimization techniques can be applied.
The policy objective consists of a second order approximation of individual utility
that allows to evaluate welfare correctly using a ﬁrst order approximation to the
equilibrium conditions. The optimal plan induces a unit root in all the real variables,
hence achieving a high degree of smoothing mainly obtained through adjustment of
government debt. The methodology employed in the paper further permits a ranking
of alternative suboptimal rules for both monetary and ﬁscal policy. The benchmark is
represented by a strict CPI inﬂation targeting rule for monetary policy and constant
debt rules for ﬁscal policy. Numerical simulations of the model show that granting
more ﬂexibility to both forms of policy will increase welfare. However, the welfare
gains from higher monetary ﬂexibility are very small when compared to the gains
from higher ﬂexibility in ﬁscal rules and the order of magnitude of the ratio is about
sixteen under the baseline calibration. Overall, the results strengthen the argument
for further research on the role of ﬁscal policy in a currency union, with speciﬁcf o c u s
on the careful design of appropriate rules that conjugate the needs of discipline and
stabilization.
Along the analysis, the benchmark has been represented by the optimal plan that
a centralized policymaker would implement by maximizing a union-wide welfare ob-
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July 2005jective. This solution represents a natural starting point to evaluate the performance
of alternative policy rules. It might be interesting however to understand the diﬀer-
ences in terms of stabilization and policy interaction under a more realistic regime
where ﬁscal authorities maximize national welfare and the monetary authority cares
about welfare of the whole currency union. In such a setting, strategic considerations
for the use of ﬁscal policy are likely to emerge and to create some tensions with
stabilization motives. This step is left for future research.
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July 2005A Appendix
This appendix describes some of the derivations of the results in the paper. Further details are con-
tained in a mathematical supplement available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/˜apf210/research/research.htm.
A.1 The Steady State
The purpose of this section is to show that the model has a well-deﬁned steady state with zero
inﬂation and constant values for all variables. I will consider the deterministic optimal policy problem
where each component of the vector of exogenous disturbances takes a constant value. I will assume
that these values are equal across countries






¯ GH,t = ¯ GF,t = ¯ G. I also impose that ¯ a,¯ µ
w > 1a n d ¯ G>0. Finally, the steady state debt level in
per-capita terms is also common for both countries, that is, ¯ bH,t = ¯ bF,t = ¯ b>0. While the value of ¯ b
is arbitrary, I will discuss below how it is nonetheless subject to an upper bound. Let X0 be the set
of initial commitments that make the solution of the problem optimal from a timeless perspective.
Given the initial degree of price dispersion in the two countries ∆H,−1 = ∆F,−1 = 1, the initial level
of per-capita debt bH,−1 = bF,−1 = ¯ b and the initial value for the terms of trade T−1 =1 ,Iw i s ht o
ﬁnd a solution that involves a constant policy and a constant set of commitments, price dispersions,
debt levels equal to the initial ones and terms of trade. The centralized planner chooses the following
variables:
{Yi,t,∆i,t,K i,t,F i,t,Πi,t,p i,t,W i,t,b i,t,τi,t,C W,t,T t,Πt}
∞





t [U (CW,t) − nV (YH,t,a H,t)∆H,t − (1 − n)V (YF,t,a F,t)∆F,t],















Wi,t = UC (CW,t)pi,t
¡










i,t CW,t + ¯ G,
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and given the initial conditions X0, ∆i,−1, bi,−1 and T−1. Also, the relative price for country i is













8,t to the constraints





10,t to the the two union-wide constraints. As pointed out by BW, additional
Lagrange multipliers are needed for the initial conditions X0 to impose constant commitments (X0 =
¯ X). These multipliers are normalized in such a way that the ﬁrst order conditions for t =0l o o k
t h es a m ea st h eﬁrst order conditions at a generic period t>0. As discussed in the previous
section, the stationarity constraints for ﬁscal policy can only be imposed on the consolidated real
value of debt at maturity nWH,0 +( 1− n)WF,0. Such commitments prevent the policymaker to
exploit the predetermined nature of debt via one-shot high inﬂation but do not imply that the
transversality condition for the real value of debt is satisﬁed a priori in both countries
58. While the




5,t, the additional multiplier on
the stationarity constraint is denoted by φ
W
5,−1 a n di np r i n c i p l ed i ﬀers from the previous two. The
resulting Lagrangian as well as the ﬁrst order conditions for the choice variables listed above are
derived in the mathematical supplement.
I wish to consider here a steady state where variables are constant
59 (denoted by an upperbar)
and where inﬂation is zero (¯ Π = ¯ Πi = 1). This steady state would imply also ¯ ∆ = ¯ ∆i =1 ,





αi (1 − σ)
1 − αi
.







The pricing equation gives
k
¡¯ Y,¯ a, ¯ µ
w¢
=( 1− ¯ τ)f
¡ ¯ C, ¯ Y
¢
,
57The Lagrange multiplier on each country’s government budget constraint is normalized by the
size of its country, which is equivalent to writing the budget constraint in terms of total rather than
per-capita levels.
58In fact, this will be true in the symmetric deterministic steady state considered here (provided










59Notice that the requirement here is also that the steady state values of the Foreign variables
correspond to those of the Home country.
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T h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tg i v e s
(1 − β)¯ b =¯ τ ¯ Y − ¯ G.
Since I assumed a positive steady state level of government purchases and debt, it follows that the
steady state tax rate must be positive. Finally, from the demand equation, it follows that
¯ Y = ¯ C + ¯ G.
Combining the last equation with the optimal pricing relation yields steady state output as a negative
function of the steady state tax rate and the steady state markup and a positive function of steady
state government purchases and productivity (¯ Y = Y (¯ τ,sg,¯ a, ¯ µ
w)w h e r esg ≡ ¯ G/¯ Y is taken as given
from the benchmark calibration). In any solution, ¯ τ must be less than unity, otherwise output would
be zero and so would be revenues for the government. Hence, over the (0,1) interval, revenues are
bounded above (as in a standard Laﬀer curve argument) and so must be ¯ b for a steady state to exist
consistent with that initial condition.
In order to verify that this is indeed a solution to the policy problem deﬁn e da b o v e ,i nt h e
mathematical supplement I also check that the ﬁrst order conditions above are satisﬁed for time-
invariant Lagrange multipliers. This step completes the proof of the existence of a well-deﬁned
symmetric steady state with zero inﬂation and positive debt. In the paper, any reference to the
steady state is to be understood in relation with the steady state just characterized.
A.2 Second Order Approximation of the Utility Function
The derivation of the second order approximation of the utility function is analogous to the closed
economy case of BW (see the mathematical supplement for details) and yields the following expression
for country H



















(1 + η) ˆ Y
2









+ t.i.p. + ◦






(1 − αH)(1− αHβ)



















£ ˆ YH,t ˆ pH,t ˆ τH,t ˆ YF,t ˆ pF,t ˆ τF,t ˆ Tt ˆ CW,t
¤0
.
I denote the single vector of exogenous shocks by ξt =
h
ˆ ξH,t ˆ ξF,t
i





ˆ aH,t ˆ µ
w





I can then express utility in matrix notation as










































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
(sc¯ µ)







0 000000−(1 − ρ)
⎤





⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
(sc¯ µ)













zπH ≡ σ(sc¯ µκH)
−1 .
The Foreign counterpart is







































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0000 0 00 0
0000 0 00 0
0000 0 00 0
0000 0 00 0
0000( sc¯ µ)
−1 (1 + η)00 0
0000 0 00 0
0000 0 00 0
0000 0 00−(1 − ρ)
⎤
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allows to eliminate the linear terms in the second order approximation of the welfare criterion above
and derive a purely quadratic criterion suitable to study optimal policy and welfare under alternative
r e g i m e si nas t a n d a r dL Qf r a m e w o r k . T h ec o m p l e t ed e r i v a t i o n sa r ea v a i l a b l ei nt h em a t h e m a t i c a l




















ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´2
+ n(1 − n)λq
³




H,t +( 1− n)λπF π
2
F,t, (66)
The term JW,0 summarizes the elements peculiar to time zero that can be taken as given in the


















































,λ q ≡ n








−1qW,πH,λ πF ≡ (1 − n)
−1 qW,πF.
Finally, for any component of the vector of shock ξi,t, I have deﬁned
ξW,t ≡ nξH,t +( 1− n)ξF,t,ξ R,t ≡ ξH,t − ξF,t.
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and ωg ≡ sg/(¯ τ − sg).
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ζW,1 + ζW,2 =( ¯ µ − 1)(1 + ωg)(¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
ζW,3 + ζW,4 = −ωτ (¯ µ − 1)(¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
ζW,5 + ζW,6 = ϕ(sc¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
ζW,7 + ζW,8 = −ϑ(¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
where ωτ ≡ ¯ τ/(1 − ¯ τ)a n d




c + η − ωτ
¢
+ ρωτ,
ϕ ≡ ¯ µsc (1 + ωg)(η − ωτ)+ρ(1 + ωg + ωτ),
ϑ ≡ (¯ µ − 1)(1 + ωg + ωτ)+θϕ.


































































w,ξ = ρsdζW,3 − scζW,5.

































































w,ξ = −sdζW,3 + θscζW,5.
The components ζW,1, ζW,3 and ζW,5 are given by
ζW,1 = n(¯ µ − 1)(1 + ωg)(¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
ζW,3 = −nωτ (¯ µ − 1)(¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
ζW,5 = nϕ(sc¯ µdζ)
−1 ,
The coeﬃcients of the inﬂation terms are





















G i v e nt h ec o m p l i c a t e df u n c t i o n a lf o r mo ft h eλ
0
is, it is not obvious to derive conditions that ensure
concavity of [66]. Here, I report numerical evaluations of those coeﬃcients as a function of the steady
state tax rate, keeping the other parameters at their benchmark value discussed in the text. It can
be seen that for any value of ¯ τ ∈ (0,1), the λ
0
is are strictly bigger than zero (see Figure A.1). It is
also interesting to notice that the main costs in terms of welfare arise from price dispersion. The
coeﬃcients on GDP inﬂation rate are very high as compared to those on the output gap and the
terms of trade gap.
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Figure A.1: Coeﬃcients of the loss function.
The target levels for Home and Foreign output as
˜ YH,t ≡ ˜ YW,t +( 1− n)θsc ˜ Tt +( 1− n) ˆ GR,t,
and
˜ YF,t ≡ ˜ YW,t − nθsc ˜ Tt − n ˆ GR,t.
Subtracting the targets just deﬁned from their level counterparts, the Home and Foreign output gaps
result as
ˆ YH,t − ˜ YH,t =
³








ˆ YF,t − ˜ YF,t =
³




ˆ Tt − ˜ Tt
´
.
A.3 The Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, I write the log-linear approximation of the equilibrium relations, where variables are
expressed in deviations from targets. Home and Foreign output, consumption and relative prices are
eliminated from the demand block of the model by appropriate substitutions.





ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´
+ ωτ (ˆ τH,t − ˜ τH,t)+( 1− n)δq
³
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δy ˜ YW,t +( 1− n)δq ˜ Tt − (1 + η)ˆ aH,t +ˆ µ
w





The parameters are deﬁned as δy ≡ η + ρs
−1
c and δq ≡ 1+ηθsc. Similarly, the aggregate supply





ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´
+ ωτ (ˆ τF,t − ˜ τF,t) − nδq
³








δy ˜ YW,t − nδq ˜ Tt − (1 + η)ˆ aF,t +ˆ µ
w





Up to the ﬁrst order, the ﬂow version of the government budget constraint is




ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´









ˆ Tt − ˜ Tt
´








ˆ YW,t+1 − ˜ YW,t+1
´
− πt+1 + ψH,t+1
i
.





˜ YW,t − ˆ GW,t
´









vH,t ≡ by ˜ YW,t +( 1− n)bq ˜ Tt +( 1+ωg)˜ τH,t − sd ˆ GH,t + ρs
−1
c ˆ GW,t +( 1− n)(1+ωg) ˆ GR,t.
The parameters are by ≡ (1 + ωg)−ρs
−1
c and bq ≡ (1 + ωg)θsc −1. The correspondent equation for
the Foreign country is




ˆ YW,t − ˜ YW,t
´









ˆ Tt − ˜ Tt
´








ˆ YW,t+1 − ˜ YW,t+1
´








˜ YW,t − ˆ GW,t
´









vF,t ≡ by ˜ YW,t − nbq ˜ Tt +( 1+ωg)˜ τF,t − sd ˆ GF,t + ρs
−1
c ˆ GW,t − n(1 + ωg) ˆ GR,t.
From the deﬁnition of the price index, one can write a relation between the CPI (overall) inﬂation
rate πt and the GDP (country-speciﬁc) inﬂation rates πH,t and πF,t
πt = nπH,t +( 1− n)πF,t.
Finally, from the deﬁnition of the terms of trade, one can also see that the percentage change in the
terms of trade is determined by the cross-country GDP inﬂation diﬀerential
ˆ Tt = ˆ Tt−1 + πF,t − πH,t.
or ³




ˆ Tt−1 − ˜ Tt−1
´
+ πF,t − πH,t −
³
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Let 2nϕ
H
1,t and 2(1 − n)ϕ
F
1,t be the Lagrange multipliers on the two aggregate supply relations, 2nϕ
H
2,t
and 2(1 − n)ϕ
F
2,t the Lagrange multipliers on the two intertemporal government budget constraints
and 2ϕ3,t and 2n(1 − n)ϕ4,t be the Lagrange multipliers on the remaining two constraints for the
relations between CPI inﬂation and GDP inﬂation rates and between terms of trade and GDP











































ˆ bH,t−1 − ρs
−1
c yt − πt + ψH,t
−(1 − β)[byyt +( 1− n)bqqt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τH,t − ˜ τH,t)]
−β
³
ˆ bH,t − ρs
−1






ˆ bF,t−1 − ρs
−1
c yt − πt + ψF,t
−(1 − β)[byyt − nbqqt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τF,t − ˜ τF,t)]
−β
³
ˆ bF,t − ρs
−1
c yt+1 − πt+1 + ψF,t+1
´´
+2ϕ3,t (πt − nπH,t − (1 − n)πF,t)
+2n(1 − n)ϕ4,t
³























where the last two lines of the Lagrangian contain the stationarity constraints for the optimal policy
from a timeless perspective discussed in the text.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimal plan reported in the text can be written compactly as
A1Etxt+1 + A0xt + A−1xt−1 = Bξt.












where, for convenience, ﬁscal variables have been expressed in terms of average and relative stances.














i,t ≡ ψi,t − βEtψi,t+1,f o ri = {W, R}. Finally, the objects A1, A0, A−1 and B are non-
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A1 =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 −β
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000−10 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 −10
00 −βnκ
−1
H −β (1 − n)κ
−1





F 00000 0 0 0
βρs
−1
c 00 0 β 0000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 00000 0 0 0
⎤




⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
λy 00 0 0 0 0 0 0ωy 00
0 λq 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 ωq 1
00 nκHλπH (1 − n)κFλπF 00 00 0 −ωf − κW 0 n(1 − n)κR
00 κHλπH −κFλπF 00 00 0−κR −ωf ˜ κ
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −10
−δy 0 nκ
−1
H −(1 − n)κ
−1





F 00 −ωτ 00 0 0 0
−νy 00 0 −1 −ωfωτ 0 −β 00 0 0
0 −νq 00 0 0 −ωfωτ 0 −β 00 0
00 −n −(1 − n)1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 1 −10 0 0 0 0 00 0
⎤





⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0 0 0000000 ρs
−1
c 00
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 0 0000000( 1 − β)ωf + κW 00
0 0 0000000 κR (1 − β)ωf 0
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 0 0000010 0 0 0
0 0 0000001 0 0 0
0 0 0000000 0 0 0
0 −10000000 0 0 0
⎤













00 0 0 0
00 0 0 −1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,
where ωf ≡ (1 − β)(1+ωg)ω
−1
τ , νy ≡ (1 − β)by + ρs
−1
c ,ω y ≡ ωfδy − νy, νq ≡ (1 − β)bq,ω q ≡
ωfδq − νq, κW ≡ nκH +( 1− n)κF, κR ≡ κH − κF,˜ κ ≡ (1 − n)κH + nκF.
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In this section, I study analytically the determinacy properties of the model under the assumption
that the degree of price rigidity is the same across countries (αH = αF). I will refer to this assumption
as A1. The mathematical supplement extends this basic analysis by evaluating the sensitivity of the
determinacy properties to alternative parametrizations. I begin with the proof of the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Under assumption A1, the equilibrium induced by the optimal policy plan can
be described by an aggregate block (in terms of average variables) and a relative block (in terms of
diﬀerence variables). The solution of each block can be determined independently.
Proof. Since the degree of price rigidity is the same, it follows that κH = κF = κ and λπH =
λπF = λπ.O n ec a nt h e nc o m b i n et h et w oﬁrst order conditions for GDP inﬂation rates [53] and [54]
to get



















Similarly, I also take the average and the diﬀerence of the Phillips curves of the two countries [45]
and [46] to obtain
πt = κ
£




πR,t = κ[ωτ (ˆ τR,t − ˜ τR,t)+δqqt]+βEtπR,t+1, (70)
The two government budget constraints [47] and [48] deliver
ˆ bW,t−1 − ρs
−1
c yt − πt + ψW,t =( 1 − β)[byyt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τW,t − ˜ τW,t)]
+βEt
³
ˆ bW,t − ρs
−1




ˆ bR,t−1 + ψR,t =( 1− β)[bqqt +( 1+ωg)(ˆ τR,t − ˜ τR,t)] + βEt
³
ˆ bR,t + ψR,t+1
´
. (72)
The solution of the average block can then be cast in terms of the sequence {yt,π t, ˆ τW,t −˜ τW,t, ˆ bW,t,
ϕ
W
2,t} which solves the system of equations composed by [51], [67], [55], [69],a n d[71]. On the other
hand, the solution of the relative block can be found by solving for the sequence {qt,π R,t, ˆ τR,t −˜ τR,t,
ˆ bR,t,ϕ
R
2,t,ϕ 4,t} the system of equations composed by [52], [68], [56], [70], [72] and [50].T h e t w o
systems are obviously independent, hence, completing the proof of the proposition.
Before moving to analyze the determinacy properties of the model, I will state and prove a
second proposition which will be used extensively in the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 4 Let P (λ) ≡ λ
2 + A1λ + A0 =0and let λ1 and λ2 be the roots of P (λ).T h e n ,
the absolute values of λ1 and λ2 split across the unit circle if and only if P (1) > 0 and P (−1) < 0
or viceversa.
Proof. First, notice that one can always rewrite the polynomial P (λ) as
P (λ)=( λ − λ1)(λ − λ2) (73)
I ﬁrst show that P (1) > 0 and P (−1) < 0 imply that the absolute values of the two roots λ1 and λ2
split across the unit circle. From the right hand side of [73], it is easy to see that
P (1) = (1 − λ1)(1− λ2) > 0, (74)
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P (−1) = (1 + λ1)(1+λ2) < 0. (75)
If P (1) > 0,i tm e a n st h a tλ1 and λ2 are on the same side of 1. Similarly, if P (−1) < 0,i tm e a n s
that λ1 and λ2 are on opposite sides of −1. I tt h e nf o l l o w st h a to n er o o tm u s tl i ei n s i d et h eu n i t
circle and the other outside. The case P (1) < 0 and P (−1) > 0 is totally symmetric. Next, I
show that if |λ1| and |λ2| lie on opposite sides of 1, it must be the case that P (1) and P (−1) lie on
opposite sides of 0. Without loss of generality, suppose |λ1| > 1 and |λ2| < 1.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s
two be considered. First, if λ1 > 1, then, one can see from [74] that P (1) < 0 and from [75] that
P (−1) > 0,w h i c hc o n ﬁrms the claim. Second, if λ1 < −1, then, again from [74] and [75], P (1) > 0
and P (−1) < 0.T h ec a s e|λ1| < 1 and |λ2| > 1 is symmetric.
Proposition 4 complements Proposition C.1 in Woodford [2003] which gives necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions for the two roots of P (λ) to be both outside the unit circle.
A.5.1 Determinacy of the Optimal Policy Plan
Given assumption A1 and Proposition 3, I can analyze the relative and aggregate block separately.










I plug the result into the evolution of the terms of trade [50] to obtain








ϕ4,t − ∆˜ Tt.
I solve the last expression for the Lagrange multiplier ϕ4,t





2,t + λπ∆˜ Tt. (76)
I update the last expression, take expectations at time t, multiply it by β and subtract it from [76]
to get













∆˜ Tt − βEt∆˜ Tt+1
´
. (77)
I then plug [77] into [52] and obtain
λqqt = −ωqϕ
R













∆˜ Tt − βEt∆˜ Tt+1
´
,


















∆˜ Tt − βEt∆˜ Tt+1
´
. (78)
From [56], I know that ϕ
R
2,t follows a random walk. Hence, the right hand side of [78] must follow a
random walk too
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2,t+2 so that the Lagrange multipliers disappear from the condition above.
Remember also that, by deﬁnition, the terms of trade gap qt = ˆ Tt − ˜ Tt. It follows that ∆qt +∆˜ Tt =
∆ˆ Tt. I can then rewrite the previous expression as
λqEt∆qt+1 = λπ
³




∆ˆ Tt+1 − Et+1∆ˆ Tt+2
´
.
In order to express the last expression mo r ec o m p a c t l y ,i tw i l lb eu s e f u lt od e ﬁne
Tt ≡ ∆ˆ Tt − Et∆ˆ Tt+1.
Finally, I obtain a single forward looking ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation in the new variable Tt which
summarizes the optimality conditions of the relative block under A1
Tt = λTEt∆qt+1 + βEtTt+1, (79)
where λT ≡ λq/λπ. The remaining conditions to study the determinacy properties come from the
equilibrium relations. From the relative Phillips curve [70] I solve for the relative tax gap to obtain









I substitute this result into the relative government budget constraint [72] to obtain
ˆ bR,t−1 + ψR,t =
ωf
κ
(πR,t − βEtπR,t+1) − ωqqt + βEt
³
ˆ bR,t + ψR,t+1
´
.
From [50], I express inﬂation rate diﬀerentials as function of variations in the terms of trade gap
πR,t = −
³
∆qt + ∆˜ Tt
´
.
I substitute the latter result into the government budget constraint to get
ˆ bR,t−1 + fR,t = −
ωf
κ
(∆qt − βEt∆qt+1) − ωqqt + βEt
³






∆˜ Tt − βEt∆˜ Tt+1
´
. (80)
I can now study the determinacy properties of the system constituted by the deﬁnition of ∆qt
∆qt ≡ qt − qt−1,
the relative government budget constraint [80], the condition [79] and the deﬁnition
Tt ≡ ∆qt − Et∆qt+1 +
³
∆˜ Tt − Et∆˜ Tt+1
´
.
Such system of four equations in four unknowns can be written in matrix notation as
AEtzt+1 = Bzt + CεR,t,
where the vector of endogenous variables is
zt ≡
£
qt−1 ˆ bR,t−1 ∆qt Tt
¤0
,












and the two new shocks are deﬁned as u
˜ T
1,t ≡ ∆˜ Tt − βEt∆˜ Tt+1 and u
˜ T
2,t ≡ ∆˜ Tt − Et∆˜ Tt+1.T h e





































The determinacy properties depend on the eigenvalues of the matrix A







−β/ωq 1/ωq (1 − β)ωf/(κωq) − β/ωq βωf/(κωq)
00 1 −1





−1B is block triangular, it follows that the eigenvalues are {λ1 =1 ,λ 2 = ω
−1
q ,λ 3,λ 4},w h e r e




−λT/β (1 + λT)/β
¸
.
The relative block has two predetermined variables (qt and ˆ bR,t). Determinacy requires two eigenval-
ues outside the unit circle (the solution possesses a unit root associated with λ1). The characteristic
equation associated to matrix D is
P (λ)=λ
2 − [1 + (1 + λT)/β]λ +1 /β =0 .
It is straightforward to see that
P (1) = −λT/β, P (1) = [2(1 + β)+λT]/β.
Given that λT = λq/λπ > 0, it follows that the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisﬁed and the
absolute values of λ3 and λ4 always lie on opposite sides of 1. Hence, determinacy depends crucially
on the value of ωq. Under the baseline calibration, it is the case that ωq =0 .341 so that λ2 > 1a n d
the relative block has a determinate solution.








and the ﬁrst order condition for average inﬂation [67] as









If u r t h e rd e ﬁne the coeﬃcients mϕ ≡− ωy/λy, nϕ ≡− ρs
−1
c /λy and ωϕ ≡−(ωf + κ)/(κλπ). One
can combine the two expressions above with the ﬁrst order condition for average debt [55] to obtain








∆yt =0 . (82)
Expressions [81] and [82] constitute a complete characterization of the optimality conditions for the
average block. Most importantly, when combined with the remaining equilibrium relations (the
average Phillips curve [69] and the average government budget constraint [71]), the resulting system
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of such system is always determinate. It follows that the condition |1/ωq| > 1 fully characterizes
the determinacy properties of the model under the optimal policy plan. Sensitivity analysis (see
the mathematical supplement) shows that determinacy occurs for wide (and relevant) regions of the
parameter space.
A.5.2 Determinacy under Simple Rules
Proposition 3, suitably modiﬁed to take into account the new policy rules, retains its validity under
simple rules too. The economy can still be characterized in terms of two blocks (aggregate and
relative).
I start again with the analysis of the relative block, which is characterized by the rule for ﬁscal
policy
ˆ bR,t =0 , (83)
and by the three equilibrium equations [70], [72] and [50]. As in the previous section, I can solve
for the tax gap from [70] and plug the result into the government budget constraint. I can also
eliminate debt using [83] and inﬂation rate diﬀerentials from [50]. The outcome is a second order







































One can easily see that












From the deﬁnition of the parameters, it is easy to see that ωf is always positive. Under the baseline
calibration, ωq > 0, hence, P (1) < 0a n dP (−1) > 0. From Proposition 4, it follows that the relative
block is determinate under the baseline calibration.
T h em o n e t a r yr u l ef o rt h ea v e r a g eb l o c ki s
πt =0 . (84)
The ﬁscal rule is
ˆ bW,t = rt. (85)
The equilibrium equations are the average Phillips curve [69], the average government budget con-
straint [71] and the log-linear approximation of the Euler equation [26] which reads as
rt =˜ rt + Etπt+1 + ρs
−1
c (Etyt+1 − yt). (86)
From [69], I solve for the tax gap to obtain




where I also used the monetary rule [84]. I replace the result into [71], together with [84] and get
ˆ bW,t−1 + u
f
W,t = ωf (ωτ − δy)yt + βˆ bW,t − βρs
−1
c (Etyt+1 − yt),
where I have exploited the deﬁnition of by to simplify terms. I can then substitute from [86] to
eliminate the last term in the previous expression and ﬁnally apply the ﬁscal policy rule [85]. The
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exogenous shocks of the form
yt =
1
ωf (ωτ − δy)
³
ˆ bW,t−1 + u
f
W,t − β˜ rt
´
. (87)









c − ωf (ωτ − δy)
¸
ˆ bW,t−1 +  W,t,
where  W,t is a composite shock whose deﬁnition is immaterial for the determinacy properties which,
instead, depend on the coeﬃcient in brackets. In particular, a non-explosive (and, hence, determi-






c − ωf (ωτ − δy)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1. (88)
Under the baseline calibration, the coeﬃcient governing the dynamics of debt is equal to 0.7724,
thus, ensuring determinacy. Again, sensitivity analysis shows that determinacy is obtained for wide
regions of the parameter space.
A.5.3 Determinacy under Flexible Rules
Once again, a modiﬁed version of Proposition 3 holds and the economy can be studied with respect
to two separate blocks.
As usual, I begin with the relative block. The only diﬀerence with respect with the previous
section is that now the relative ﬁscal rule is
ˆ bR,t + θscφqt =0 . (89)

















































Given that under the baseline calibration ωq and ωf are positive, P (−1) > 0 ∀φ>0. Therefore, a
necessary condition for determinacy of under ﬂexible rules is given by P (1) < 0w h i c hc a nb es o l v e d




=1 0 .4676. (90)
Next, I turn to analyzing the average block. The ﬂexible rule for monetary policy which substi-
tutes [84] is
πt + γ∆yt =0 . (91)
On the other hand, the ﬂexible ﬁscal rule is
ˆ bW,t + φyt = rt. (92)
As before, I eliminate taxes from the average Phillips curve [69]. This time, however, CPI inﬂation
is not zero. Hence, I substitute for that variable from [91] to obtain
ˆ τW,t − ˜ τW,t = −
γ
κωτ
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ˆ bW,t−1 + γ∆yt + u
ψ




+ βˆ bW,t − βρs
−1
c Et∆yt+1 + βγEt∆yt+1
I can collect terms and express the last expression as












Et∆yt+1 + ωf (ωτ − δy)yt = (93)
















Et∆yt+1 + φyt =˜ rt. (94)
The determinacy properties of the average block depend upon the system constituted by expressions
[94] and [93], together with the deﬁnition
yt = ∆yt + yt−1. (95)
The system can be written in the form
AEtzt+1 = Bzt + CεW,t,
where the vector of endogenous variables is
zt ≡
£ ˆ bW,t−1 ∆yt yt−1
¤0
,




































with a12 ≡ γ − ρs
−1






, a23 ≡ ωf (ωτ − δy)a n db22 ≡ γ (1 + ωf/κ). Let





c11 c11b22 + c13 c13




where c11 = −a12/d, c13 =( a12a23 − φa22)/d, c21 =1 /d, c23 =( βφ− a23)/d.I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et o
p r o v et h a ta tl e a s to n ee i g e n v a l u eo fA
−1B is equal to zero (the diﬀerence of the second and third
column is equal to the ﬁrst multiplied by b22,h e n c e ,A
−1B is singular and must have at least one null
eigenvalue). Hence, determinacy requires that the two remaining eigenvalues lie on diﬀerent sides of
1. The other two eigenvalues are the solution of the characteristic equation
P (λ)=λ
2 − (1 + c11 + b22c11 + c23)λ +( c11 + b22c11 + c11c23 − c21c13)=0 .
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P (1) = a23/d,
and













From the deﬁnitions of the parameters, one can see that under the baseline calibration P (1) < 0
and P (−1) > 0 ∀γ>0. Hence, by Proposition 4, it follows that in this case the average block has
always a determinate solution. On the other hand, when φ>0a n dγ =0( ﬂexibility is granted to
ﬁscal policy only), it is possible to obtain a closed form solution for output similar to [87] and derive







c + βφ− ωf (ωτ − δy)
. (96)
Comparing the expression of [96] with [88], one can see that the eﬀect of a positive φ is to reduce
the coeﬃcient. Hence, under the baseline calibration, a restriction on φ can be derived by solving







I nt h em o r eg e n e r a lc a s ew h e nb o t hﬂexibility parameters are positive, the two conditions above
become
P (1) = −c23 (1 − c11) − c21c13,
and
P (−1) = 2(1 + c11 + b22c21)+c23 (1 + c11) − c21c13.
I solve numerically for these two conditions to ﬁnd the set of values for γ and φ that satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 4. The results show that the binding constraint for determinacy derives
always from [90].
A.6 Welfare and Solution of the Model
In this section, I show a simple and computationally feasible method to derive the value of welfare
under a given policy rule. The exposition is slightly more general than in previous sections but it will
be obvious that the exercises conducted in the text ﬁts naturally in the setup described hereafter. It
is assumed that the welfare objective can be written as








where Lt ≡ y
0
tQyt is the per-period loss function, the vector yt has dimension (n × 1) and contains all
the endogenous variables (predetermined and not predetermined) and Q is a given (n × n) symmetric
matrix. It is further assumed that the solution of the model can be written in vector auto-regression
representation
yt = Ayt−1 + Bεt, (97)
for initial conditions y−1 =0a n di.i.d. shocks εt with mean zero. Given the solution [97], the
per-period loss function can then be rewritten as
Lt =( Ayt−1 + Bεt)
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shocks.
Welfare will be evaluated from an ex-ante perspective. Hence, I integrate over the distribution of
shocks at time zero and denote by E {·} the corresponding expectation. I analyze the two components
of the welfare objective separately. I begin from the second component whichi se a s i e rt os o l v e .L e t
Ω ≡ E {εtε
0















































































Ic a nt h e nr e w r i t eJ in recursive form using the zero initial condition as



























Using the properties of the vec operator (see Hamilton [1994], p.265), it is then possible solving for
vec(J) from the last equality






The command “reshape” in Matlab allows to obtain the matrix J back. The value of welfare is then
given by











Expression E {L(y−1)} constitutes the basis for the welfare analysis conducted in the text.
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